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HERCULES, HERBERT, AND AMAR:
THE TROUBLE WITH INTRATEXTUALISM
Adrian Vermeule* and Ernest A. Young-
Do the provisions of the Constitution fit together in a coherent
scheme? Should judges interpret the Constitution as if they do? Akhil
Amar's recent article, Intratextualism,1 answers "yes" to both of these
questions. Amar takes a familiar canon of statutory construction -
that similar terms appearing in different parts of a statute should gen-
erally be interpreted to have similar meanings - and expands it into
an ambitious new approach to constitutional interpretation. Amar de-
scribes intratextualism as a form of "holistic textualism" through which
the words of the Constitution are seen as part of broad linguistic and
structural patterns. By paying heed to these patterns, the ingenious
reader may achieve interpretive insights that would be lost to "clause-
bound" interpreters, who never lift their eyes above the narrow hori-
zons of individual constitutional provisions.
Amar's article is a fresh and interesting contribution to a field
plagued by the chronic worry that little new remains to be said. Yet
we are skeptical about Intratextualism's general project and specific
claims. A quarter-century ago another constitutional theorist, Ronald
Dworkin, articulated a general theory of legal interpretation that
shared Amar's central idea that the relevant legal materials fit to-
gether, or at least should be read to fit together, into a coherent pat-
tern.2  The protagonist of Dworkin's theory was Hercules, an ideal
judge endowed with infinite patience and resourcefulness. The un-
avoidable impression left by Dworkin's account was that it would take
a judge like Hercules to wrest coherence from the chaotic mass of
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modem law. And the obvious criticism of Dworkin was that Hercules,
of course, does not exist.
Our basic critique of Intratextualism derives from similar concerns.
All interpretive techniques, including the strong form of holistic textu-
alism that Amar proposes, are the product of two factors: a theory of
constitutional obligation that explains why the interpretive technique
in principle yields legitimate decisions and an account of the institu-
tional capacities of constitutional interpreters that explains why those
interpreters will perform more successfully in practice with the pro-
posed technique than with some other approach. At critical points in
the argument, Intratextualism fails to address these issues of obligation
and institutional capacity; when it does address them, it proves unper-
suasive.
First, although Intratextualism is ambiguous about its account of
constitutional obligation, neither of the accounts most plausibly attrib-
uted to Amar - originalism or text-oriented conventionalism - pro-
vides any necessary normative justification for Amar's Herculean ap-
proach to constitutional meaning. Whether an originalist or a
conventionalist would understand the Constitution as a deeply coher-
ent document are difficult questions that Amar has largely failed to
investigate. Amar's assumption of constitutional coherence is also de-
scriptively implausible in light of the heterogeneity of the Constitution,
a document whose component provisions were enacted at different
times, in different circumstances, and for different reasons, and whose
interpreters generally read different types of provisions in different
ways.
Second, Amar does not examine judges" interpretive capacities or
their likely performance under the alternative regimes of intratextual-
ism and clause-bound interpretation. That examination would require
difficult empirical and predictive judgments. But we doubt that
judges laboring under severe constraints of time, information, and ex-
pertise would perform better, even by Amar's own lights, under a re-
gime of intratextualism than under its clause-bound competitor.
Whichever regime would better serve such judges, Amar's failure even
to consider these institutional issues creates a yawning gap in his de-
fense of intratextualism.
Part I lays the groundwork by detailing Amar's intratextualist
methodology and by specifying the alternative interpretive approach
that Amar opposes.3 We distinguish "weak intratextualism," a canon
of interpretation suggesting that, all else equal, similar provisions
should be read similarly, from "strong intratextualism," an approach
that uses inferences drawn from parallel provisions to trump localized
3 See it a pp. 733-39.
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arguments based on text, history, and precedent. Although Amar muf-
fles his claims in cautious language, we conclude that strong intratex-
tualism is at the heart of his proposal and that he frequently attempts
to justify the overriding of locally based interpretations. Amar ad-
vances his approach as an alternative to "clause-bound" interpretation,
in which interpreters proceed by examining the local text, history, and
precedent of particular constitutional provisions, without attempting to
read the Constitution in a holistic, coherent manner. Despite Amar's
contempt for clause-bound interpretation, we believe that it remains a
necessary component of intratexualist interpretation. And this fact has
important implications for our critique.
In Part II, we examine Amar's theory of constitutional obligation. 4
Intratextualism contains a pervasive, if only partially articulated, as-
sumption that the Constitution is a fully coherent document. We criti-
cize this assumption on both normative and descriptive grounds.
Normatively, Amar has not advanced an account of constitutional ob-
ligation that would justify the coherence assumptions of intratextual-
ism. Descriptively, Amar's strong assumption of coherence stands at
odds both with the patchwork character of the Constitution and with
the settled practice of constitutional interpreters. We argue, using
some of Amar's own examples, that traditional clause-bound practice
may afford important advantages not captured by a global interpretive
approach like intratextualism.
Part III introduces Herbert, a rather pedestrian judge first em-
ployed by Dworkin as a foil for Hercules.' For Herbert, hampered by
the cognitive and institutional limitations that hamper actual judges, it
is not at all obvious that the best interpretive approach is simply to
follow the Herculean ideal as best he can. We thus focus in Part III on
intratextualism's merits and demerits as a second-best theory of inter-
pretation for real judges acting with limited time, information, and in-
terpretive expertise. 6  Comparing intratextualism with clause-bound
interpretation from this second-best perspective, we conclude that in-
tratextualism may well increase the decision costs and error costs asso-
ciated with constitutional interpretation, loosen interpretive constraints
on judges, and destabilize interpretive practice. In a world in which
most judges are more like Herbert than Hercules, a clause-bound ap-
proach may well be preferable along all these dimensions.
4 See ifrna pp. 739-59.
S See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 2, at 1103-04.
6 See infra pp. 759-77.
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I. WHAT IS "INTRATEXT*UALISM"?
The intratextualist interpreter "tries to read a contested word or
phrase that appears in the Constitution in light of another passage in
the Constitution featuring the same (or a very similar) word or
phrase."7 As a "classic example" of this technique, Amar begins with
McCulloch v. Maryland," in which Chief Justice Marshall drew upon
the phrase "absolutely necessary" in Article I, Section io (concerning
duties and imposts) to clarify the meaning of "necessary" in the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause.9 Because the Framers used "absolutely neces-
sary" to convey a strong sense of necessity, Marshall reasoned, the un-
adorned "necessary" in Article I, Section 8 should not be understood to
imply a similar sense of strict limitation.' 0 Different words mean dif-
ferent things."
The same words, conversely, ought generally to mean the same
thing to an intratextualist. 12 One of Amar's arguments about the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause, for example, relies upon the term
"speech" in Article I, Section 6's Speech or Debate Clause. That
clause, which provides that senators and representatives "shall not be
questioned in any other Place" for "any Speech or Debate in either
House," plainly applies only to political speech. Hence, Amar says, the
same word in the Free Speech Clause ought likewise to be read to pro-
tect only, or at least chiefly, political speech. 13 One consequence of this
view is that Supreme Court opinions that "shrink the doctrinal differ-
ence" between political and commercial speech are misguided.' 4  An-
other consequence is that courts need not worry too much about con-
tent-based distinctions in regulating free speech, so long as there is no
7 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 748.
8 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (I8i9).
9 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 756-5 7 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 414-,5).
10 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 414-15.
11 Except when they mean the same thing. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the extreme
malleability of intratextualism in practice).
12 Except when they mean different things. See infra 'Part mI.B.2 (discussing the extreme
malleability of intratextualism in practice).
13 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 815.
14 Id. at 812-13 (discussing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (x996)). Al-
though Amar reserves his primary fire for Justice Thomas's concurrence in 44 Liquormart, which
argued that there is no "philosophical or historical basis" for according commercial speech less
protection than political, see Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 813 (quoting 44 Liquormart,
517 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., concurring)), it is clear that his attack is directed more broadly at the
majority of the Court's recent commercial speech jurisprudence, see id. at 812-13 (discussing the
44 Liquormart plurality), as well as other cases extending First Amendment protection beyond
classic verbal and written political debate, see id. at 813 (criticizing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 520 U.S. i8o (1997), which recognized a First Amendment right of cable television system
operators to control the content placed on their networks, and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976),
which extended First Amendment protection to expenditures of money in political campaigns).
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discrimination on the basis of viewpoint. Legislatures, after all, fre-
quently restrict the subjects of political debate. s
These two examples illustrate the flip sides of Amar's intratextual-
ist project: the familiar recourse to a nearby clause's use of the same
word in McCulloch, on the one hand, and on the other the startling
juxtaposition of "the freedom of speech" with "speech or debate." We
begin by examining the tension between these two faces of intratextu-
alism.
A. Strong or Weak?
Intratextualism has its roots in the familiar principle of statutory
construction that, ordinarily speaking, "identical words used in differ-
ent parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning." 16
This principle is usually stated as a "natural presumption," and it fre-
quently comes with a qualification that "the presumption is not rigid
and readily yields" whenever variations in context or other sources of
meaning suggest that the identical terms were in fact used with differ-
ent intent. 17 We may call this relatively uncontroversial, tie-breaking
version of the principle "weak intratextualism."' 8
Sometimes Amar seems to advocate little more than weak intratex-
tualism; his article has more hedges than an English garden. Amar is
careful, for example, not to "claim that intratextualism is the only or
even the best form of constitutional argument, or that it will work in
every important case." 19 Two of Amar's three types of intratextualism
- using the Constitution itself as a dictionary to show that a contested
term can mean a certain thing20 or to suggest patterns in the document
that favor certain readings over others2 - seem easily compatible
with weak intratextualism. Even the third, more demanding type,
which reads the Constitution "as if a metacommand clause existed
telling us to construe parallel commands in parallel fashion," is limited
Is See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 86; see also id. (urging a "parliamentary model
of freedom of speech").
16 Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (199o) (quoting Sorenson v. Secretary of the rleasury,
475 U.S. 85 1, 860 (1986)); see also Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87 (1934);
Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932).
17 Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, 286 U.S. at 433; see also Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65
(1916) (Holmes, J.) (refusing to apply the presumption).
18 Even this weak version has its enemies. See Walter Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Pro-
cedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 337 (i933) ("The tendency to assume that a
word which appears in two or more legal rules ... has and should have precisely the same scope
in all of them ... has all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against");
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 598 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Cook, supra).
But we are not among them.
19 Amar, fntratextualism, supra note i, at 788.
20 See id. at 791-92 (discussing "Intratextualism as Philology").
21 See id. at 792-94 (discussing "Intratextualism as Pattern Recognition").
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by "the possibility that, upon reflection, there are sound constitutional
reasons not to treat the individual commands as in pari materia."22 At
times, intratextualism resembles a brainstorming technique rather than
a technique for resolving interpretive issues; Amar says, for instance,
that it "will not so much dictate results as suggest possible readings. 2 3
Finally, the evidence amassed by Amar to show that intratextualism is
"an important form of constitutional argument bearing a distinguished
legal pedigree" 24 is generally consistent with the weak approach. In
McCulloch v. Maryland2 s and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee26 - two deci-
sions that (Amar says) used intratextualism successfully 7 - intratex-
tualism figures as one in a broad arsenal of legal weapons, existing
alongside historical, structural, and pragmatic arguments.28
Whether Amar is advocating only weak intratextualism or some-
thing more consequential turns on the strength of the presumption in
favor of reading like words alike in the face of contradictory evidence
generated by other tools of interpretation. Strong intratextualism
would enable a reading of a provision somewhere else in the document
to trump clause-specific textual or historical evidence, or legal prece-
dent, concerning the provision in dispute.29 When Amar turns from
decided cases to his own analyses, Intratextualism takes on this more
radical cast. His reading of the Free Speech Clause, for instance,
would allow two intratextual factors - the use of "speech" in Article I,
Section 6's Speech or Debate Clause and the parallel structures of the
First Amendment and the Necessary and Proper Clause - to trump a
great deal of precedent extending significant First Amendment protec-
tion to commercial speech and erecting a formidable barrier to con-
tent-based regulation of expression. 30 His reading of Section 5 of the
22 Id. at 795.
23 Id. at 799.
24 Id. at 749.
2S 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 36 (xig).
26 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (18&6).
27 Amar's other examples are of cases in which the Court should have used intratextualism
but didn't, see Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 763-73 (discussing Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (i Cranch) 137 (x8o3) and Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (I954)), or in which the Court did
use intratextualism but poorly, see id. at 773-78 (discussing Rj)e v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
28 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 750-58 (discussing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 36); id. at 758-63 (discussing Martin, x4 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304).
29 We speak of precedent here as a persuasive indicator of constitutional meaning. See, e.g.,
Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 691-92 (x994). We consider the stare decisis value of precedent
and its relation to intratextualism infra pp. 773-74.
30 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 812-18. For the Court's holdings on commer-
cial speech, see, for example, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 5x7 U.S. 484 (1996); Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commissiozi, 447 U.S. 557 (198o); and Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (976). On
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Fourteenth Amendment in pari materia with Section 2 of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, likewise, permits his interpretation of the latter
provision to trump originalist evidence concerning the drafting history
of the Fourteenth Amendment itself.3' Amar's doctrinal proposals
thus display a strong version of intratextualism with radical potential
to redirect First Amendment law, reconceptualize equal protection as
declaratory of due process, or use the theory of enumerated powers as
a restraint on the Bill of Rights. 32
It thus seems fair to focus our critique on the strong version of in-
tratextualism that generates these arresting outcomes. It would be
odd, after all, to read Amar as having devoted eighty law review pages
to advocacy of a familiar, weak presumption in favor of reading simi-
lar words to say similar things. The criticisms we raise here, however,
will generally apply to any version of intratextualism, with the impor-
tant qualification that the degree of interpretive risks and costs will
vary according to the weight given to intratextualist readings. While
weak intratextualism is usually inoffensive, 33 its use should always be
accompanied by a candid assessment of its liabilities.
Amar's version of intratextualism might also be either strong or
weak along a second dimension: the extent to which he asks judges to
prefer intratextualist readings in the face of contrary precedent. In
constitutional interpretation, the question of meaning is always distinct
from that of institutional design. 34 Just as one might argue that judges
should be able to prefer their own view of constitutional meaning to
content discrimination, see, for example, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State
Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 1o5 (iggi); and United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 3o (199o).
31 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 822-24. Amar views the interpretations gener-
ated by intratextualism as consistent with the originalist evidence concerning the Fourteenth
Amendment mustered by Justice Kennedy in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520-24
(1997), which indicated that the Reconstruction Congress rejected a draft that would have given
Congress plenary legislative power over civil rights. But Amar's interpretations - which would
either give Congress the power "to define rights that in good faith it considers truly fundamental
and basic" or at least treat Congress's definition "as powerful evidence of fundamentality in
courts" - are hardly "middle-ground." Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 824. If Congress
may define any right of property, family relations, education, etc. as "fundamental," thereby trig-
gering broad enforcement powers, then it is hard to see how Amar's proposal would not reinstate
the "plenary" legislative power rejected by the drafters. Amar's view is thus best read as over-
coming the Fourteenth Amendment's drafting history based on the broader enforcement power
that has been read into the Thirteenth Amendment.
32 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 812-18 (free speech); id. at 772-73 (equal protec-
tion); id. at 814-15 (enumerated powers and the Bill of Rights).
33 Some use of weak intratextualism may even be obligatory, at least in some cases. See, e.g.,
Laurence H. Tfribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation, xo8 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1272 (1995) (noting that "peripheral vi-
sion seems essential for coherent structural argument in constitutional law").
34 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tibe, and
Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1251 (1997).
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that of the political branches only in exceptionally clear cases,3s one
might also argue that judges' application of particular interpretive
theories should be limited by stare decisis. 36
Here, too, Amar seems to advocate a strong version of his theory.
Intratextualism is obviously a theory to be applied by judges; Amar's
examples of intratextualism in practice, after all, are overwhelmingly
drawn from judicial opinions.3 7 Amar says relatively little about stare
decisis, and it is possible that he would ask judges to apply intratextu-
alist analysis only in open-textured cases, in which clause-bound
precedent does not dictate a different result. This, of course, would
render Amar's prescriptive examples of academic interest only, as each
example - the Court's content discrimination and commercial speech
cases, Morrison v. Olson,38 and City of Boetne v. Flores39 - involves
precedents otherwise entitled to stare decisis effect.40 Given Amar's
powerful attack on Morrison,41 it is hard to believe that he would
counsel the Justices to adhere to it in a future case. And his contention
that "content-based discriminations are not themselves (even presump-
tive) violations of the freedom of speech" 42 seems to call rather clearly
for a retreat from current doctrine. More generally, Amar's invocation
of the democratic virtues of textualism over the "inherently exclusion-
ary" - read 'elitist' - "arts of doctrinal analysis"43 would be largely
beside the point if doctrine wins whenever it is well-established. In
the end, Amar seems to be attempting not only to forestall errors in fu-
ture cases, but also to cure past mistakes.44
35 See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).
36 See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353,382 (198i).
37 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 749-78. Amar's recent work on criminal proce-
dure, which employs significant intratextual analysis, is likewise directed to "a lawyer or judge
who needs to understand a particular clause or amendment to deal with the case at hand."
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL. PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES
x (1997) [hereinafter AMAR, FIRST PRINCIPLES].
38 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
39 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
40 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 802-26. Amar suggests that the Court's opinion
in Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 65x (1997), undermined Morrison's precedential status, but
the question would still remain whether the Court acted properly in Edmond by preferring an
intratextual reading to a prior decision on point.
41 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 809-12.
42 Id. at 817. Indeed, because "the entire edifice of First Amendment doctrine ... is itself con-
tent-based," Amar asserts that judges' adherence to the ban on content discrimination by the po-
litical branches is "obtuse and self-dealing." Id. This is not the language of someone who would
counsel the Court to adhere to the existing edifice for stare decisis reasons.
43 Id. at 796.
44 Again, Amar's work on criminal procedure provides helpful evidence. See, e.g., AMAR,
FIRST PRINCIPLES, supra note 37, at x6o (calling for a radical "reconceptualization of the field"
and urging "judges," as well as "scholars, lawmakers, and citizens," to "rally to the banner I have
tried to raise"); Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law after Rodney
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No one should be surprised that, in the hands of someone as in-
genious as Amar, a dusty canon of construction is transformed into a
sweeping tool of constitutional redefinition. And Amar's article, in
both its length and its tone, has the unmistakable cast of someone
seeking to say something new and important, with significant implica-
tions for real cases. But the liabilities of intratextualism that we iden-
tify below extend in principle to any version of intratextualism, strong
or weak. The only difference is that the magnitude of these problems
will vary in proportion to the aggressiveness with which intratextual-
ism is employed. Where intratextualism is done modestly, its advan-
tages may outweigh its liabilities, but even then interpreters would do
well to remain cognizant of the method's problematic assumptions.
B. The Role of Clause-Bound Interpretation
Amar's principal target is "clause-bound" interpretation. The
clause-bound interpreter incurs Amar's ire whether or not the inter-
preter focuses principally on text or on a mixture of text, history, and
precedent. In either event, clause-bound interpretation is "blinkered" s
and treats "the document.., as a jumbled grab bag of assorted
clauses."46 By contrast, intratextualism "always focuses on at least two
clauses and highlights the link between them," and "read[s] a two-
dimensional parchment in a three-dimensional way, carefully folding
the parchment to bring scattered clauses alongside each other."47
It is critical to understand, however, that clause-bound interpreta-
tion is itself a component of intratextualism. Standing alone, even a
strong version of intratextualism is necessarily incomplete. Intratextu-
alism always requires at least two constitutional provisions: text A and
text B. And in order for text B to help us interpret text A, we must al-
ready understand the meaning of text B. If we are to avoid an infinite
regress, intratextualism itself cannot supply the initial meaning for text
B. That means "we still need other tools of interpretation" not simply
to "finally assess the plausibility of any reading suggested by intratex-
tualism," as Amar admits, 48 but to generate those readings in the first
place.
King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. I, 27 (x995) (calling for the Court to overrule a case inconsistent with
Amar's view of the Fifth Amendment). We discuss the implications of intratextualism for stare
decisis further infra pp. 767-69.
4S See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note t, at 788.
46 id. at 795.
47 Id. at 788.
48 id. at 799; see also id. at 796 n.193 ("Even though intratextual analysis will often lead read-
ers to consider certain clauses and their possible interrelation, fully satisfying constitutional analy-
sis will often require the use of other tools of interpretation once the relevant clauses and ques-
tions have been identified.").
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In the abstract, at least, it should not matter which interpretive
techniques we use to fix the meaning of text B. Whether its interpre-
tation is derived from plain meaning, originalist history, judicial prece-
dent, or numerology, an established meaning for text B will be neces-
sary, even under a weak version of intratextualism, to arrive at a
meaning for text A. But judging by Amar's examples, his interpretive
approach is an eclectic version of clause-bound interpretation that re-
lies upon a mixture of arguments from text, history, and precedent.
For example, Amar asks whether "the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, rati-
fied in 1971, protect[s] the right of eighteen-year-olds to 'vote' in juries
as well as in ordinary elections."49 Amar answers this question by re-
ferring to the text and history of the assertedly parallel Fifteenth
Amendment. Because that Amendment "was -drafted to encompass the
political right of citizens to serve and 'vote' on juries, this fact about
word usage and constitutional meaning in 1870 would be relevant to
an intratextualist confronting a different (but parallel) amendment
adopted ioo years later." 0
Because clause-bound readings are a necessary component of in-
tratextualism, Amar is implicitly comparing two interpretive regimes:
one clause-bound regime that emphasizes the local meaning of consti-
tutional provisions in the light of text, history, and precedent, and an-
other regime, intratextualism, which considers all of those sources, but
additionally considers parallel provisions in the light of their text, his-
tory, and precedent, and seeks illumination by comparing the two pro-
visions.51 The latter regime makes strong assumptions about constitu-
tional coherence and the interpretive competence of judges. We
examine the coherence assumption in Part II, and Amar's optimistic
view of judicial capacities in Part II.
II. HERCULES' CONSTITUTION: COHERENCE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION
In his influential article Hard Cases, Ronald Dworkin imagined an
ideal judge, Hercules, who served as the protagonist of Dworkin's in-
terpretive theory.5 2 When the judge confronts an issue to which the
governing legal materials do not immediately provide a clear answer
- a "hard case" - the Herculean task is to develop a general theory
that takes into account all the relevant constitutional and statutory
provisions, judicial precedents, and philosophical principles, and then
49 Id. at 789.
so Id.
51 See inJra pp. 741, 743, 750-57.
s2 See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 2, at 1083.
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to apply that theory to decide the particular case at bar.53  Hercules
formulates and applies "top-down" theories5 4 that are conceived at a
high level of theoretical abstraction and are intended to unify a large
area of legal material. And Hercules performs these tasks with infinite
patience and superhuman wisdom.55
Amar, of course, uses real judges as his examples, not characters
out of mythology5s 6 Yet Intratextualism shares two critical assump-
tions with Hard Cases: the belief that top-down coherence is possible
across a broad range of issues arising in constitutional interpretation,
and the exhortation that even non-Herculean judges should strive for
this ideal.57 Amar never undertakes to defend these assumptions, and
their truth is far from obvious.
This Part examines the coherence assumption. Section A explains
and illustrates Amar's tacit belief that the Constitution's drafters, in-
terpreters, and amenders together create a fully theorized and inte-
grated document. Section B critiques Amar's coherence assumption
on the normative ground that it lacks foundations in any theory of
constitutional obligation that could plausibly be attributed to Amar.
Section C critiques the coherence assumption on descriptive grounds,
arguing that the coherence assumption misdescribes the Constitution
as a historical text and misdescribes the prevailing practices of consti-
tutional interpreters.
53 Id. at 1094 ("[Hercules] must construct a scheme of abstract and concrete principles that
provides a coherent justification for all common law precedents and, so far as these are to be jus-
tified on principle, constitutional and statutory provisions as well.").
54 See Richard A. Posner, Legal Reasoning From the Top Down and From the Bottom Up: The
Question of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 433 (x992) (defining
top-down reasoning)..
55 See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 2, at IO83 ("[Hercules is] a lawyer of superhuman
skill, learning, patience and acumen .... ).
56 However, we will suggest in Part III that the real judges Amar praises, such as Marshall,
are so heavily mythologized as to serve the same role in Amar's theory that Hercules serves in
Dworkin's. See infra pp. 761-62.
S7 Both admirers and detractors have noted this attraction to constitutional coherence in
Amar's work. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Utility and Significance of Professor Amar's
Holistic Reasoning, 87 GEO. L.J. 2327, 2328 (1999) (reviewing AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS) (de-
scribing Amar's book, The Bill of Rights, as "the most self-conscious, refined, and comprehensive
use of (holistic interpretation] in constitutional scholarship"); Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosen-
berg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowl-
edge, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1149, 1172 (1998) (accusing Amar of pursuing "logical consistency
for its own sake"); Susan R. Klein, Enduring Principles and Current Crises in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 533, 562-63 (igg) (reviewing AMAR, FIRST
PRINCIPLES) (criticizing Amar's assumption that "a single value underlies criminal procedural
guarantees"); Carol S. Steiker, "First Principles" of Constitutional Criminal Procedure: A Mis-
take?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 68o, 687 (1999) (charging that Amar's work on criminal procedure
"may well overestimate the value of coherence").
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A. Hercules as Drafter, Amender, and Interpreter
Amar makes no bones about the degree of coherence that his theory
assumes in, or imputes to, the Constitution: "Perhaps the greatest vir-
tue of intratextualism," he says, is that "it tal':es seriously the document
as a whole rather than as a jumbled grab bag of assorted clauses ....
[I]t is a (single, coherent) Constitution we are expounding."' This as-
sumption is critical. Amar's favorite aspect of the McCulloch opinion
is Chief Justice Marshall's juxtaposition of "necessary" in Article I,
Section 8, with "needful" in Article IV, Section 3, which confers power
upon Congress to make "rules and regulations" for the territories.5 9
Because Article IV clearly contemplates the power to create corporate
bodies (like territorial governments), Marshall infers that Article I's
similar language must include a similar power (to create a bank). Yet
this juxtaposition works only if the Constitution is read to entail a
strong norm of internal consistency.60
We are still, of course, a step short of assuming that the Constitu-
tion embodies a coherent theory of the sort that Dworkin's Hercules
might construct; similar words might have similar meanings through-
out the document, without implying any broader sense of theoretical
consistency. Yet Amar cheerfully takes this step by identifying his the-
ory as a textual brand of constitutional holism. This "holistic textual-
ism," Amar says, "calls for special skill, seeing and showing how dif-
ferent clauses cohere into larger patterns of constitutional meaning."6'
Amar's insight that the First Amendment's "Congress shall make no
law" language parallels the Necessary and Proper Clause's "Congress
shall have Power ... [t]o make all laws" terminology, for example,
quickly expands into an argument that the First Amendment forbids
only what the original Constitution did not authorize.62 Amar uses in-
tratextualism, in other words, to read the structural theory of enumer-
ated powers into the Bill of Rights. Such a reading is perfectly appro-
priate, he claims, because "the textual interlock between the First
Amendment and the Necessary and Proper Clause was no coincidence
but part of a deep design."63
58 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 795.
59 See id. at 757-58 (extolling this argument as Marshall's "intratextual ace" or "trump card").
60 Cf infra note 122 (suggesting that the differing contexts of Articles I and IV may well mat-
ter here). A separate problem is that it is not clear, on Amar's theory, that Marshall was correct to
read "necessary" as equivalent to "needful"; perhaps the difference in wording should make a dif-
ference. This is an example of the malleability of intratextualism, which we discuss infra pp. 767-
69.
61 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 796.
62 Id. at 814-IS; see also id. at 81g ("[Tihe words of the [First] Amendment were designed to
interlock with those of the Necessary and Proper Clause, and thus affirm that Congress simply
lacked enumerated power to restrict speech or free exercise in the states.").
63 Id. at 814.
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Now we can make out the shadow of Hercules. Amar's constitu-
tion is completely theorized.64 Particular provisions do not have local
meanings that fail to fit easily into an overarching plan; rather, every-
thing fits together seamlessly as "part of a single coherent Constitu-
tion."65 This is the sort of constitution that Hercules might write: a
document embodying a single textual, institutional, and political
scheme, with all its parts integrated into a coherent whole. Everything
has been thought through in terms of its relation to everything else,
and jarring elements have been eliminated. Any given provision may
offer clues to the meaning of others, no matter how distant in location
or purpose, because all are parts of the same "deep design."66
Amar is surely aware of many of the tradeoffs, political battles won
and lost, and compromised ideals that went into the drafting of the
Constitution. 67 And Amar is quick to acknowledge that many of the
underlying unities that he finds in the document were likely not spe-
cifically intended by its drafters. Like a great play, he says, the Consti-
tution "may contain a richness of meaning beyond what was clearly in
the playwright's mind when the muse came,"68 although Amar also in-
sists that "the pattern here is not constitutionally coincidental. '" 69 In-
tratextualism thus emerges not only as an empirical assumption about
drafting, but also as an imperative for reading; the "genius of the Con-
stitution," he concludes, is both "a genius of its writers" and "a genius
of its readers."70
This move clinches Amar's kinship to Dworkin. Intratextualism
directs interpreters to "look for ... consistency rather than inconsis-
64 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, io8 HARV. L. REV.
1733 (1995) (contrasting "completely theorized" and "incompletely theorized" positions).
65 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 822.
66 Id. at 814. One might object, on Amar's behalf, that only similarly worded provisions are
assumed to share this sort of kinship. Yet here, too, Amar is unafraid to take the next step.
"Even if adjoining clauses have no linguistic overlap," he says, "they often deal with related sub-
jects, and each is often illuminated by careful comparison with its neighbors." Id. at 796. Nor is
the "adjoining" constraint any more critical than that of shared wording. The Citizenship Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Attainder and Nobility Clauses of Article I are all brought
to bear on Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), not because they are placed close together -
although the last three are, in fact - but because they each share the trait of applying to both the
state and the federal governments. See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note z, at 769-72; see also
id. at 788 ("[I]ntratextualism often reads the words of the Constitution in a dramatically different
order, placing textually nonadjoining clauses side by side for careful analysis."). These clauses
thus form, in Amar's view, a "larger pattern[] of constitutional meaning" that is not dependent on
linguistic similarity or textual proximity.
67 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CON-
STITUTION 24 (1991) (noting the extent to which the Fugitive Slave Clause, for example, com-
promised "many of the ideals found elsewhere in the document").
68 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 793-94.
69 Id. at 794.
70 Id.
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tency" 71 - to make the text, in Dworkin's terms, "the best it can be."
72
Like Amar, Dworkin directs judges "to identify legal rights and duties,
so far as possible, on the assumption that they were all created by a
single author - the community personified - expressing a coherent
conception of justice and fairness."73 But also like Amar, Dworkin
knows that Hercules was not the original drafter and that all prior en-
actments cannot be rationalized under "any single, coherent scheme of
principle." 74 "Law as integrity" requires, however, that "we must re-
port this fact as a defect,... and that we must strive to remedy what-
ever inconsistencies in principle we are forced to confront."7" So too
for Amar with text and structure: the Constitution must be read, as far
as possible, as if it sprang fully formed from the forehead of James
Madison, and any inconsistencies are to be regretted and minimized.
76
Amar would apply this theory of interpretation not only to dispa-
rate provisions of the original Constitution, but also to provisions
drafted at different times in our history.7 7 Intratextualism thus implies
a particular theory of constitutional amendment: when a new amend-
ment to the Constitution is ratified, it modifies not only the provisions
that the framers and ratifiers explicitly set out to modify, but also any
provision that shares linguistic or structural similarities with the new
text. When Amar reads the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause as declaring the meaning of Due Process in the same
amendment, for example, his next move is to interpolate that meaning
back into the Fifth Amendment's identically worded Due Process
Clause. 78 Each new amendment is thus a new datum in a global pat-
tern of constitutional meanings, virtually any part of which is at least
potentially subject to alteration, or even wholesale reconceptualization,
as a result of the change. This approach effectively imposes
Dworkin's principle of "legislative integrity" on constitutional amend-
ments. 79 Hercules, in other words, must pull duty as amender as well
as initial drafter and ultimate interpreter.
71 Id.
72 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 229 (1986).
73 Id. at 225.
74 Id. at 2 17.
7S Id.
76 See, e.g., Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 766-73 (devising a series of ingenious ar-
guments to eliminate the textual inconsistency arising from the fact that the Equal Protection
Clause appears to govern only the states).
77 See, e.g., id. at 772-73 (reading the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments together); id. at 822-
23 (reading the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in pari materia, although they were rati-
fied several years apart).
78 See id. at 772-73.
79 DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 72, at 176. Dworkin's principle of legislative integ-
rity "asks lawmakers to try to make the total set of laws morally coherent." Id.
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These three labors of Hercules are integrated into Amar's general
assumption of constitutional coherence. But Amar never evaluates
that assumption as a normative imperative or a descriptive claim.
Rather, he simply cites intratextualism's holistic aspects as a "strength"
of the theory.80 We question whether the coherence assumption is a
strength in the next two sections, which respectively explore the as-
sumption's normative and descriptive weaknesses.
B. The Problem of Obligation
Any theory of constitutional interpretation must address, if only
implicitly, what David Strauss calls "the central problem of written
constitutionalism," that is, why we should accept as binding "the
judgments of people who lived centuries ago in a society that was very
different from ours."' A response to this central problem might be
called an account of constitutional obligation. Such an account is a
necessary component of theories of interpretation because it specifies
which interpretations are to count as erroneous and which as correct.
A theorist who cannot say what makes the Constitution authoritative
can never explain why an interpreter ought to read the Constitution
one way rather than another.
Amar never explicitly offers (or incorporates by reference) any ac-
count of constitutional obligation. Sometimes Amar seems to assume
an originalist account, sometimes a conventionalist account. But both
possibilities are problematic for Amar. Neither originalism nor con-
ventionalism supports the strong coherence assumptions of the in-
tratextualist method. Accordingly, Amar's interpretive approach lacks
normative justification in any account of constitutional obligation, or
at least in the accounts most plausibly discerned in his article.
Although Amar does not discuss the question of constitutional obli-
gation directly, much of his intratextual analysis is interwoven with
historical exploration. These passages, and the general corpus of his
80 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 795.
81 David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 880
(1996); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1 19, 1119 (1998) ("For the textualist a theory of political legitimacy comes first, followed by a
theory of interpretation that is appropriate to the theory of obligation."); Michael W. McConnell,
Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (1998) ("We can-
not address the question of how to interpret the Constitution ... without first understanding why
we should consult the decisions of persons long dead .... 2). As Strauss demonstrates, the nature
of our theory of obligation has consequences for interpretive method. See Strauss, supra, at 885-
87, 9o6-Il. Thus, a proponent of a particular interpretive doctrine must either argue for some the-
ory of obligation compatible with the doctrine or else show that, based on some empirical find-
ings, all (plausible) theories of obligation converge in justifying the doctrine. See Adrian Ver-
meule, Interpretation, Empiricism, and the Closure Problem, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 698, 698-99
(1999) (discussing the relationship between theories of interpretive legitimacy and the choice of
interpretive doctrine).
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work, suggest that Amar is best described as an originalist.82 And
originalism does have a theory of obligation. Originalists commonly
argue that the framers' intent matters because "the force of law derives
from the authority of the lawmaker";8 3 the theory of obligation is, in
other words, fundamentally positivist.8 4 Yet it is by no means clear
that an originalist would embrace an intratextualist approach to con-
stitutional interpretation or its strong assumption of coherence. One
problem, discussed in the next section, is descriptive. Perhaps there
simply is no single coherent originalist understanding of the whole
Constitution; there may be only originalist understandings of different
parts of the document generated by framers and ratifiers of different
provisions. But there are normative problems as well.
If constitutional obligation derives from the authority of the fram-
ers of each provision, then their views on interpretation would seem to
matter a great deal.85  Intratextualism would, in that case, be both
82 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RE-
CONSTRUCTION 181-214 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS] (supporting his theory of
incorporation by exhaustively examining the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Akhil Reed Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment [hereinafter Amar, Popu-
lar Sovereignty], in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 89, 92-108 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (justifying his ac-
count of constitutional amendment by use of originalist evidence).
83 Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 233 (1988); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 145 (199o) ("If the Con-
stitution is law, then presumably its meaning, like that of all other law, is the meaning the law-
makers were understood to have intended."); Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution:
Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1Q19, 1024 (1992) ("An entirely sufficient reason for origi-
nalism, is that interpreting a document means to attempt to discern the intent of the author .... ").
This is not the only argument for or variety of originalism, see Young, supra note 29, at 631-32
(discussing various bases for originalism), but many of the alternatives share this ultimate de-
pendence on the authority of the original lawmaker, see Strauss, supra note 81, at 886-87 & nn.28
& 30 (discussing Lawrence Lessig's "translation" theory and Bruce Ackerman's idea of "higher
lawmaking" as "more sophisticated variants of originalism"). Justice Scalia justifies originalism as
the interpretive theory best suited to the limited institutional competence of courts. See Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989). We supply a similar in-
stitutional critique of intratextualism in Part I, infra.
84 See Strauss, supra note 81, at 885-86 (tracing originalism to the "command theory" of Aus-
tin, Bentham, and Hobbes); McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, supra note
81, at 1132 (describing originalism as resting on "constitutional positivism").
85 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 366 (1977) (justifying originalism on the ground that it was
an "interpretive presupposition[]" of the Constitution's drafters). But see Kay, supra note 83, at
259 ("It is not illogical to argue that judges should restrict themselves to the original intentions of
the constitution-makers even if the constitution-makers themselves thought otherwise."). Origi-
nalists who dismiss the importance of the framers' interpretive intent tend to rest originalism on
conventionalist grounds. See id. at 286-87. We discuss the incompatibility of intratextualism
with conventionalism infra pp. 746-48. For general discussion of the significance of lawmakers'
interpretive expectations, see Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF
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theoretically and historically contingent; its legitimacy would depend
on whether Amar's particular version of originalism requires or allows
him to defer to the interpretive expectations of the Framers and also
on whether the Framers actually intended the Constitution to be inter-
preted in the way Amar suggests. Yet Amar concedes that many of
the intratextual linkages he employs were most likely not specifically
intended by the framers of the relevant provisions. As previously
noted, he analogizes the Constitution to a "great play," which "may
contain a richness of meaning" that transcends the author's intent.8 6
But works of literature do not impose legal obligations, and it is a little
odd to hear someone generally committed to democratic deliberation 7
emphasizing meanings that were never before identified, much less de-
liberated upon.
To be sure, it is logically possible that the Framers did not specifi-
cally intend particular intratextualist readings, yet nonetheless wished
the document to be read as a coherent whole. But Amar has simply
made no originalist case for that interpretive proposition. That case
would be difficult to make in any event. Amar would have to demon-
strate not only that Madison and his friends were intratextualists, but
also that the framers and ratifiers of each amendment shared Amar's
holistic theory of amendment. That seems unlikely. Interpretive con-
ventions change over time,88 and theories of amendment come and
go. 89
Amar might also be described not as an originalist but rather as a
conventionalist, grounding his account of constitutional obligation in
the American people's common acceptance of the constitutional text.
Amar extols the text's "democratic virtues": "The Constitution is a
compact document that most Americans can read."90 Here, Amar sug-
LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 256-68 (Robert P. George ed., x996); and Adrian
Vermeule, Judicial History, 1o8 YALE L.J. 1311 (x999).
86 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 793; see also id. at 790 ("[Ilntratextualism draws in-
ferences from the patterns of words that appear in the Constitution even in the absence of other
evidence that these patterns were consciously intended.").
87 See Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immunities: The
Nixon and Clinton Cases, xo8 HARV. L. REV. 701, 710-15 (1995) (arguing that temporary presi-
dential immunity is needed to protect the President's role in democratic deliberation); Amar,
Popular Sovereignty, supra note 82, at i i o (emphasizing the importance of real deliberation in the
amendment process).
88 See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 887-88 (1985) (concluding from the historical evidence that reliance on "original intent"
emerged as a dominant interpretive strategy after 18oo and that this strategy in turn differed sig-
nificantly from modern versions of originalism).
89 Amar himself has demonstrated that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment shared a
willingness to evade the strictures of Article V that would be unacceptable today (at least outside
the confines of the Yale Law School). See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Con-
stitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994).
90 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 796.
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gests that the Constitution binds us because it is a democratic "focal
point" to which all Americans can look for solutions to current dilem-
mas. The important thing about the Constitution is thus not the
authority of "dead men" in "cold graves,"9' but rather the fact that
most Americans know (or can know) what the text says and generally
agree on it as an authoritative plan of government.92
But this conventionalist account of obligation creates certain oddi-
ties for Amar's theory. Conventionalism and focal points are fre-
quently means of sustaining an "overlapping consensus" characterized
by allegiance to a common Constitution without broad agreement on
particular moral or philosophical theories.93 But the same reasons that
support bracketing controversial moral and philosophical issues in fa-
vor of agreement on a political principle like constitutionalism likewise
point toward avoiding broad, "top-down" theories of the Constitution
in favor of "incompletely theorized agreements" on particular constitu-
tional questions.94  Conventionalism thus creates some tension with
Amar's completely theorized approach to the constitutional text.
An even more serious defect of intratextualism, when viewed from
a conventionalist standpoint, is that it is too complicated and abstruse.
"Conventionalism suggests that, other things equal, the text should be
interpreted in the way best calculated to provide a focal point of
agreement and to avoid the costs of reopening every question."9 But
the text can hardly serve as such a focal point if the meanings derived
from it are unexpected or obscure. As Amar acknowledges, intratex-
tualism "may lead to readings that are too clever by half";96 consider,
for example, Amar's use of the Bill of Attainder Clause and the No-
bility Clause to defend the result in Boiling ,v. Sharpe.97 The argument
is ingenious, perhaps brilliant, but it requires a certain suspension of
disbelief. 98 And the person-in-the-street for whom the Constitution is
supposed to serve as a focal point is likely to be altogether mystified by
it.
Intratextualism likewise undermines the other aim of convention-
alism - to avoid the costs of reopening every question. As discussed
91 Amar, Popular Sovereignty, supra note 82, at ix5.
92 See Strauss, supra note 81, at 911 (observing that on a. conventionalist account, the Consti-
tution's "salience and general acceptability, rather than its authority or optimality, are the most
important reasons for accepting it").
93 Id. at 907; see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (1993) (discussing the
idea of an overlapping consensus).
94 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 46-48 (1996).
95 Strauss, supra note 81, at 912.
96 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 799.
97 347 U.S. 497 (x954); see Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 769-71.
98 See Daniel Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (x986) (suggesting
that "brilliant" theories are untrustworthy precisely because of their novelty).
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at greater length in Part III, intratextualism frequently proves incon-
sistent with respect for stare decisis; the Attainder Clause argument
just noted, for example, would require a radical reconsideration of that
clause's meaning.9 9 The importance of avoiding such reopenings
arises because, on Amar's view, "American-style written constitution-
alism is a temporally extended intergenerational project calling for a
sensitive collaboration between generations of writers and later gen-
erations of readers."'' 1 Burkeans believe that such intergenerational
projects are impossible without the attention to past interpretations
that stare decisis embodies.101
It may be that Amar would adopt neither an originalist nor a con-
ventionalist account of constitutional obligation. But some such ac-
count he must have, and neither of the accounts most plausibly attrib-
uted to him justifies the strong coherence assumptions of
intratextualism. In these respects Intratextualism proves normatively
ungrounded. The next section will argue that it is also descriptively
flawed.
C. 7vo Types of (In)coherence
The coherence theory reflected in Intratextualism has both a sub-
stantive and an interpretive dimension. The substantive dimension as-
sumes that the Constitution's particular provisions fit together to ar-
ticulate a consistent set of structural and political imperatives.102 The
interpretive dimension assumes that the same rules of interpretation
should apply to each part of the Constitution. We question both as-
sumptions. Substantively, the Constitution displays as much heteroge-
neity and particularity as it does coherence and integration. As a mat-
ter of interpretive practice, constitutional interpreters do not follow a
single approach to constitutional interpretation that applies across the
various parts of the Constitution.
99 Under conventional doctrine, a bill works a forbidden attainder only if it (i) targets a nar-
row class of disadvantaged persons, see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447 (1965), and (2)
inflicts "punishment," see Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468
U.S. 841, 851 (1984).
100 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 794.
101 See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and radition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990);
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE io8 (T.H.D. Mahoney
ed., Bobbs-Merrill Educ. Publ'g 1986) (790); see also McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand
of the Past, supra note 81, at 1130 (noting that a conventionalist theory of obligation demands "a
strong doctrine of stare decisis").
102 Dworkin would go even further, requiring Hercules likewise to fit the overwhelming major-
ity of constitutional precedents into his coherent theory. See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 2,
at 1094 ("Hercules must now develop his concept of principles that underlie the common law by
assigning to each of the relevant precedents some scheme of principle that justifies the decision of
that precedent.").
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i. Substantive (in)coherence. - Amar supposes that the Constitu-
tion displays strong substantive coherence across different provisions,
even those enacted at different times. In the Fourteenth Amendment,
"equal protection" provides a clarifying gloss on "due process," and af-
ter 1868 that gloss is imported into the Fifth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause as well.'0 3 "Speech" reflects a consistent commitment to
political discourse in the Speech or Debate Clause and the First
Amendment. 104 The words "inferior courts" and "inferior officers" im-
pose a uniform set of direct hierarchical relationships in Article III and
Article 1fI.105 And anyone who does not believe in this sort of substan-
tive coherence is "reading with blinkers on."'1
6
Substantive coherence, however, is hardly uncontroversial. Amar's
view embodies what Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf have called
"the hyper-integrationist fallacy" of "treating the Constitution as a kind
of seamless web.' 0 7 Tribe and Dorf reject "the notion that the Consti-
tution embodies an immanent, unitary, changeless set of underlying
values or principles" as "an extraordinary intellectual conceit"; this
conceit, they argue, is "inconsistent with the character of the Constitu-
tion's various provisions as concrete political enactments that repre-
sent historically contingent, and not always wholly coherent, compro-
mises in a document that was made in stages, incrementally, over a
period of two centuries." 0 8 Moreover, an effort to achieve coherence
across constitutional provisions may undermine the document's ability
to protect divergent values. Amar's equation of due process and equal
protection, for example, would foreclose the argument that the former
protects traditional values, while the latter embodies a forward-looking
critique of traditional practices. 0 9
The Constitution is only one of many such patchwork laws. Some-
times, for instance, statutes are so large and complex, and encompass
so many different purposes that courts have refused to apply the nor-
mal presumption that the same words in the same act mean the same
103 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 772-73.
104 See id. at 815.
105 See id. at 805-07.
106 Id. at 822.
107 TRIBE & DORF, supra note 67, at 24. Although the primary targets of Tribe and Dorf's
critique are theories that superimpose on the Constitution "a unitary vision of an ideal political
society," that critique also encompasses any theory which would read the Constitution as "a co-
herent, consistent document." Id.
108 Id.
109 See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1988); see also Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 38 (iggi) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The
Equal Protection Clause and other provisions of the Constitution, unlike the Due Process Clause,
are not an explicit invocation of the 'law of the land,' and might be thought to have some counter-
historical content.").
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thing. 01 And it is difficult to imagine how Amar's approach might be
applied to some of the more prolix state constitutions, which may en-
compass literally hundreds of vastly different provisions."1 Substan-
tive coherence, in other words, is a contingent characteristic of legal
texts.
We can best illustrate the difficulties associated with a broad as-
sumption of substantive coherence by turning to some of Amar's ex-
amples of intratextualism in action. Amar himself advises that "[t]hese
questions are best answered by example rather than by a priori rea-
soning."112  In our view, Amar's examples highlight the existence of
substantive incoherence in the Constitution at the levels of structure
and of particular terminology and therefore demonstrate the impor-
tance of close attention to context rather than a broad willingness to
transfer meanings from one part of the document to another. As Jus-
tice Scalia has said - in a somewhat different context - "[i]n textual
interpretation, context is everything." 113
(a) Enumeration and the Bill of Rights. - Although one could
imagine a version of intratextualism limited to importing definitions of
individual terms from one constitutional provision to another, Amar's
vision is not so confined. He reads, for example, the textual similari-
ties between the First Amendment and the Necessary and Proper
Clause - "Congress," "shall," "make," and "law" appear "in the same
order in two places" 14 - as support for reading the Federalists' doc-
110 See, e.g., Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 5og F.2d 1220, 1223 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly,
J.) (finding that the presumption could not be applied to the Internal Revenue Code).
111 For an empirical study of the lengths of state constitutions and the frequency with which
the states amend them, see Donald S. Lute, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 355, 358-6o (1994). Lute's data reveal that the three state constitutions with
the greatest original length - those of Alabama, Louisiana, and Oklahoma - were well over ten
times longer than the original federal constitution when adopted. See id. at 367 tbl. A-i. The
original length of the average state constitution currently in force was over four times that of the
original federal constitution. See id. The average state constitution is amended more than once a
year, see id., while the federal constitution has been amended on average less than once every
seven years.
112 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 827 n.305.
113 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 37 (1997) (discussing the differences
between the statutory and constitutional "contexts" rather than the differing historical contexts of
individual constitutional provisions).
114 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 814. Interestingly enough, Amar would not appear
to read "Congress" as having the same meaning in the First Amendment and Speech or Debate
Clause, because he vigorously approves of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (2964),
which applied the First Amendment to judicial as well as legislative restraints on speech, id. at
264 ("[T]he rule of law applied by the Alabama courts is constitutionally deficient for failure to
provide safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press." (emphasis added)). See Amar, In-
tratextualism, supra note I, at 812 (praising the grand themes of this grand opinion); cf. Strauss,
supra note 81, at 907 ("'Congress' in the First Amendment is taken, without controversy, to mean
the entire federal government, even though elsewhere 'Congress' certainly does not include the
courts or the President.'.
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trine of enumerated powers as a limit on the scope of the Bill of
Rights:
If everyone thought that Congress simply lacked all enumerated power to
restrict "speech" in the states, the "speech" they all had in mind must ob-
viously have been political discourse as opposed to mere commercial ad-
vertising. For no one denied that Congress did indeed have broad power
to regulate commercial things for purely commercial purposes (so long as
the commerce involved goods or services crossing state lines). Is
But who are "everyone," "they," and "no one"? Amar recognizes
that there actually were two quite different schools of thought: Feder-
alists, who thought the idea of enumerated powers alone sufficient to
protect liberty, and "[n]ervous Antifederalists" who demanded some-
thing more. 116 In fact, the Antifederalist position represented a fun-
damentally different structural model of government. Believing (with-
out liking the fact) that the Constitution granted very broad powers to
the central government, the Antifederalists insisted on affirmative lim-
its on those powers where individual rights were concerned. 117
The Bill of Rights having arisen out of the Antifederalists' distrust
of the doctrine of enumerated powers, it is passing strange to see Amar
read that doctrine back into the First Amendment. Based on a thin
textual similarity - one would expect almost any possible version of
each clause to use words like "Congress," "shall," "make," and "law" -
Amar limits the scope of the First Amendment to forbid only legisla-
tion that would have been beyond Congress's enumerated powers in
the first place. This view seems inconsistent with Marshall's own
formulation in McCulloch, which required that Congress's actions be
not only "within the scope" of the enumerated powers, but also "not
prohibited" by some other restriction." 8 And it is easy to come up
with bizarre results under Amar's approach. For instance, Congress's
power over "commerce" extends well beyond commercial speech.
What if Congress were to ban the importation of newspapers or news-
paper stories from one state into another? Such a measure would
rather dramatically undermine the Fourth Estate's ability to check
government power, yet it could hardly be struck down as exceeding
Congress's commerce power." 9
115 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 815.
116 Id. at 814.
117 See Calvin R. Massey, Federalism and Fundamental jRights: The Ninth Amendment, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 305, 316-23 & 36 nn.58-59 (1987). After the New Deal's virtual elimination of
the model of limited, enumerated powers, the Antifederalist model of broad power with affirma-
tive limits is much closer to our actual system.
118 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
119 Cf., e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363-64 (1903) (upholding restriction on interstate
shipment of lottery tickets). Another problem arises when we ask how Amar's approach could
possibly govern abridgments of speech by state governments? Such governments, after all, have
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Courts and commentators have generally read the Bill of Rights as
superimposing an affirmative limits model on the original enumerated
powers model. 120 This practice defeats grand attempts to harmonize
the Constitution's structure into a single "deep design," for the two
models embody very different institutional strategies. Indeed, Profes-
sor Tribe breaks down the two strategies we've described into no less
than seven different models for constitutional argument and deci-
sion.121 The enumerated powers model establishes a substantive allo-
cation of lawmaking authority between federal and state governments.
The affirmative limits model, on the other hand, creates immunities
valid against any government in order to ameliorate the difficulty of
predicting when an enumerated power, like commercial regulation,
might collide with an important sphere of rights. Because these ap-
proaches operate in fundamentally different ways, it is dangerous to
rely too heavily on intratextual linkages between provisions that reflect
different structural models.122
(b) Is "Speech" Just "Debate"? - Similar difficulties arise when
one borrows the meaning of a particular term rather than a whole
structural approach. Amar says that, because "speech" appears in the
Speech or Debate Clause of Article I, Section 6, as well as in the First
Amendment, and because "speech" in Article I is rather clearly limited
to political speech, the same word in the First Amendment should be
similarly limited. 123 He also contends that, because content-based dis-
always been assumed to possess general legislative powers (except as limited by their own consti-
tutions). See Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been
Amended? (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) >27: Accounting for Constitutional Change, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 82, at 13, 28 n.47. Amar acknowledges that the
Fourteenth Amendment raises different issues, see Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 817-18,
but given his general assumption that "speech" means the same thing everywhere, his failure to
discuss those issues is puzzling.
120 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-3, at 6-9 (3d ed.
2000).
121 See id. § 1-2, at 6.
122 Another example involves Amar's favorite argument from McCulloch, which equates Arti-
cle I, Section 8's conferral of "necessary" powers on Congress with Article IV's broad grant of all
"needful" powers to govern the territories. See McCulloch, i7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 422, discussed in
Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 757-58. The territories, which existed prior to the estab-
lishment of state governments, are a field of unitary federal sovereignty, while McCulloch's appli-
cation of the Necessary and Proper Clause to events within an existing state necessarily impli-
cated the allocation of powers under a regime of dual sovereignty. Cf Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76 (1982) (plurality opinion) (noting Congress's ex-
traordinarily broad power over the territories). A provision designed for unitary sovereignty may
well be an untrustworthy guide to the limits of federal authority vis-&-vis the States. That may be
why Marshall employed the argument with "a bit less flourish," Amar, Intratextualism, supra note
i, at 757, in McCulloch.
123 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 815; see also id. at 8x6 (asserting that "political
discourse akin to legislative 'speech and debate"' should be "the central paradigm" of the First
Amendment). Amar is careful to deny any suggestion that "commercial speech should be cast out
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tinctions are frequently accepted in the context of legislative debates,
such distinctions "are not themselves (even presumptive) violations of
the freedom of speech." 24 But here, too, context ought to be critical.
It is hardly surprising to find that "speech," as it appears in a pro-
vision dealing solely with members of Congress, contemplates only po-
litical expression. But so what? What does that tell us about whether
non-legislators ought to have special freedom to produce art, consume
pornography, or advertise their wares? 125  Words frequently take on
more limited meanings in some contexts than others, yet we do not or-
dinarily understand them to retain those limitations (even presump-
tively) when used in a situation where a broader meaning is more
natural. Amar admits, as he must, that "[t]here are obvious practical
differences of context between formal legislative assemblies on the one
hand, and conversations among the people out of doors on the
other.' 26 But in fact these contextual differences are so overwhelming
that the Speech or Debate Clause can tell us nothing at all about the
substance and limits of "speech" in the First Amendment.
One clue to the importance of these differences is Amar's need to
cabin his intratextual conclusions with limiting principles derived from
other sources. Amar says, for instance, that "viewpoint discrimination
in the regulation of political discourse" is absolutely prohibited, 27 yet
subject matter restrictions are routinely used in legislative arenas with
the purpose to suppress particular viewpoints. Consider, for instance,
a decision by congressional leaders not to allow floor debate or
amendments on the subject of tobacco legislation or welfare reform. If
Amar thinks that similar measures outside the legislative arena ought
to be invalid, that conclusion must be driven by a theory other than
intratextualism. Yet if some non-intratextualist theory is all that tells
us why content discrimination is acceptable but viewpoint discrimina-
tion is not, what work is intratextualism doing in the first place?
There are plenty of good arguments for limiting free speech protection
of the First Amendment." Id. at 817. But that is the import of the intratextual argument that
"speech" should have the same meaning in both clauses. Any limits on that argument must come
from other sources - like the prudential recognition that clemn distinctions between commercial
and political speech may be hard to draw. See id.
124 Id. at 817.
125 We might usefully ask what the framers of the First Amendment should have said if they in
fact intended a broader meaning than that in Article I. Should they have used some other word
like "expression" instead of "speech"? Neither word is usually understood as having a broader
meaning in terms of subject matter; rather, Amar would have to rely on the simple choice to use a
word different from the one employed in the earlier provision. Even then, "expression" would be
no further in meaning from "speech" than "needful" is from "necessary." Amar, Intratextualism,
supra note 1, at 757-58.
126 Id. at 817.
127 Id. at 816.
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to political speech or at least focusing judicial attention there. 128 But
those arguments ultimately have little to do with intratextual linkages
between the Free Speech Clause and the Speech or Debate Clause or
the Necessary and Proper Clause. In the free speech context, Ock-
ham's Razor leaves intratextualism on the cutting-room floor.
(c) Inferior Officers and Courts. - A third example concerns the
Court's holding, in Morrison v. Olson, 129 that the Appointments
Clause permits the appointment of independent counsels by a judicial
panel. 130 The Clause says that only "inferior" officers may be ap-
pointed by the courts of law, so a critical question in Morrison was
whether the independent counsel could be considered an inferior offi-
cer. 13 1 Amar's primary intratextual argument compares "inferior offi-
cers" in Article II's Appointments Clause with "inferior courts" in Ar-
ticle III and with Article I, Section 8's grant to Congress of the power
to create tribunals "inferior to" the Supreme Court. From these
sources, Amar concludes that when the Constitution says "inferior," it
means "subordinate." Because the independent counsel is not subordi-
nate to the President (the President cannot direct the counsel's activi-
ties, for example), the Appointments Clause forbids the independent
counsel to be appointed by judges, so Morrison was wrong. 132 For re-
jecting this intratextual argument and overlooking others, Amar calls
the majority opinion so "weak" that it "feels like the work not of the
Chief Justice who signs it, but of a young law clerk with limited con-
stitutional vision." 33
Amar's intratextualist approach, however, has limitations of its
own. Whether or not they dictate a contrary result in the end, numer-
ous contextual differences between courts and executive officers de-
mand attention. First, while we tend to see the primary function of
128 Amar cites Professor Meiklejohn's similar position, derived from a theory of democratic
self-government. See Amar, Intratextulism, supra note i, at 816-17 (discussing ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE
34-36 (196o), and Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, x961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245, 253).
129 487 U.S. 654 (x988).
130 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
131 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670-71.
132 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note z, at 8o5-o8. Amar relies heavily upon a similar argu-
ment in the dissenting opinion in Morrison. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 719-20 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). The Scalia dissent, however, does not exemplify Amar's approach, but rather applies the
uncontroversial interpretive canon we have called weak intratextualism. The dissent invokes a
variety of standard clause-bound sources to determine that "inferior" in the Appointments Clause
means "subordinate" - sources such as the records of the Constitutional Convention debate on
the Clause, precedents interpreting the Clause, and dictionaries of the era, see id. at 719-22 -
and the intratextualist argument is not given pride of place.
133 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 803-04. This characterization is an ad hominem
attack, not an argument, and it overemphasizes the role of law clerks.
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the Supreme Court as unifying the system of federal law,134 it is not
obvious that executive enforcement policy requires the same degree of
uniformity. After all, the existence of independent agencies is well-
established, if not unquestioned, and some have characterized the idea
that the Chief Executive is supposed to unify federal rulemaking as a
relatively new and controversial development. 135
Second, the Constitution provides for a number of internal and ex-
ternal checks on judicial power, such as the Seventh Amendment's Re-
examination Clause,13 6 the appointments process, and Congress's
power (recently exercised) to limit federal jurisdiction. 13 7  But some
have argued that the equivalent original constitutional checks on the
Executive have been severely eroded in the modern administrative
state, particularly with the recognition of lawmaking authority in the
executive branch.1 38  Federal judicial authority is limited by state judi-
cial authority under the Erie and adequate state grounds doctrines,139
while the executive branch's authority under the Supremacy Clause
has sometimes been treated as subject to no similar limitation.1 40  The
President is, of course, subject to the fundamental political check of
popular election, but whether this check limits executive authority to
134 See, e.g., Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, Address Before the American Bar Association (Sept.
7, 1949), quoted in ROBERT L. STERN, EUGENE GRESSMAN, STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO &
KENNETH S. GELLER, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 4.1, at 164 (7th ed. 1993) ("The function
of the Supreme Court is ... to resolve conflicts of opinion on federal questions that have arisen
among lower courts, to pass upon questions of wide import under the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States, and to exercise supervisory power over lower federal courts."); SUP.
CT. R. xo.i (identifying conflicts as the most persuasive reasons for granting certiorari).
135 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965 (x997)
(criticizing recent efforts to centralize rulemaking responsibility within the Executive Branch);
Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism, 22 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 227, 227 (1998) (arguing that "the new presidentialism has undesirable societal impli-
cations").
136 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (stating that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law").
137 See RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 31-34 (4 th ed. 1999
Supp.) (discussing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 1o4-
132, 1io Stat. 1214, 1217-21 (amending 22 U.S.C. §§ 2253-55 (Supp. 1997)), and the Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 1io Stat. 3oo9-
546, 3oo9-607 to 3-09-612 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. 1997)) which both restrict federal
court jurisdiction). Numerous statutory and procedural rules -- such as deferential standards of
review for district court judgments, limitations on appellate jurisdiction, and the existence of
multi-member panels - likewise create internal checks on judicial power.
138 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231, 1240-41 (1994) (describing the death of the nondelegation doctrine).
139 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Murdock v. Mayor of Memphis, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
140 See, e.g., City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1988) (citing Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986)) (recognizing the independent authority of executive
agencies to preempt state law).
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the same extent, at the same times, and in the same way as other
checks limit the judiciary is a complicated empirical question. At a
minimum, it seems unwise to dismiss readings of "inferior" in Article II
that would permit internal checks - such as investigative officers
with a significant degree of independence - without a careful exami-
nation of the divergent institutional contexts of Articles H and I.
Problems also arise from assuming that "inferior" means the same
thing when it describes an institution (a court) as when it describes an
individual (an officer). As Amar recognizes, his interpretation raises
the issue of whether lower-court judges are "inferior officers" who need
not be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.141
Amar purports to "take no position" on this issue, 142 but how can he
not? If "subordination" is the test of inferiority, as he claims, 143 then
district and circuit judges are "inferior." To avoid this problem with-
out adopting an ad hoc test, we would have to make removability the
criterion, a course which Amar explicitly rejects 144 and which casts
doubt upon the status of cabinet officers, who are supposed to be
"principal" officers.' 41 In any event, lower courts are not always "infe-
rior" in the sense of subordinate to the Supreme Court; Congress, after
all, can limit the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over them at least in
some respects. 14
6
Our aim is simply to raise these questions, not to resolve them.
Reasonable people - not to mention the two of us - disagree as to
the proper ultimate result in cases like Morrison. The point is simply
that intratextual comparisons may raise more questions than they an-
swer, and that frequently intratextualism will have little to say about
the truly difficult issues in a case. Amar, of course, does not purport to
have solved the independent counsel puzzle either; he claims only that
"an intratextual analysis generates some remarkably promising leads
and clues" to that puzzle.' 47 But that is no more than we would ex-
pect of a weak version of intratextualism. If intratextual comparisons
are to trump other forms of evidence and authority, such as judicial
precedents or historical evidence, then we would expect intratextual-
141 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 807 n.232.
142 Id.
143 See id. at 805.
144 See id. at 807.
145 Cf. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935) (stating that cabinet offi-
cers are removable at the will of the President).
146 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (conferring appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court,
"with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make"); see also Mark
Tashnet, "The King of France with Forty Thousand Men": Felker v. Turpin and the Supreme
Court's Deliberative Processes, 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 163, 183-89 (examining Congress's constitu-
tional authority to preclude Supreme Court review).
147 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 811.
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ism to have more power to resolve the truly difficult issues than it
seems to in Amar's examples.
2. Interpretive (in)coherence. - Amar's assumption of constitu-
tional coherence has a second, interpretive dimension: he assumes that
the same rules of interpretation should apply to each of the Constitu-
tion's different provisions. As we observed earlier, intratextualism
uses the meaning of text B to provide insight into the meaning of text
A, but intratextualism cannot itself provide the initial meaning of text
B. That requires an underlying interpretive theory, such as origi-
nalism. Intratextualism may produce jarring results, however, if the
interpretive theory employed for text B is one not customarily applied
to text A or provisions like it.
An example ought to help illustrate the point. A common descrip-
tion of our constitutional practice is that "some [constitutional provi-
sions] are interpreted more expansively than others."14  Justice Frank-
furter observed:
Broadly speaking, two types of constitutional claims come before this
Court. Most constitutional issues derive from the broad standards of fair-
ness written into the Constitution .... Such questions, by their very na-
ture, allow a relatively wide play for individual legal judgment. The other
class gives no such scope. For this second class of constitutional issues de-
rives from very specific provisions of the Constitution.... Their meaning
was so settled by history that definition was superfluous. 149
For instance, no one uses the various expansive interpretations of
"equal" developed in the context of the Equal Protection Clause to
construe Article V's guarantee to each state of "equal" representation
in the Senate. The fact that flexible interpretation has never been ap-
plied to Article V's Equal Suffrage Clause and, conversely, purely
formal definitions of equality are not generally applied to the Four-
teenth Amendment, highlights the puzzle of interpretive incoherence.
The puzzle is that Justices of widely varying ideology often agree
on interpretive method while hotly disputing the proper result; more-
over, the Justices often converge on different methods in different con-
texts. The federalism and Establishment Clause cases, for example,
display widespread acceptance of originalism as an interpretive
method but vigorous disagreement over what the history shows;' 10
likewise, in the context of free speech, even Justices who are on record
148 Strauss, supra note 81, at 882; see also Monaghan, supra note 36, at 361-62 (describing the
"two-clause theory" of interpretation); "lkibe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously, supra note 33,
at 1247-48 & 1247 n.9o (distinguishing between "architectural" and "aspirational" provisions).
149 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 325 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
150 See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, '89-93, 846-50 (x995) (vigorous de-
bate between Justices Stevens and Thomas over proper interpretation of originalist historical ma-
terials); Lee v. Weisman, 5o5 U.S. 577, 612-16, 632-36 (I99:i) (similar debate between Justices
Scalia and Souter).
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in favor of originalism tend to eschew historical analysis.is We are
not sure how these patterns develop, but one plausible explanation is
that the Justices have found, over time, that different approaches sim-
ply work better in different areas. 5 2
If interpretive practice takes a contextual approach to interpretive
method, then it is a mistake for Amar to draw intratextual inferences
that govern, for example, both the First Amendment's Free Speech
Clause and its Establishment Clause.15 3 Those provisions have tradi-
tionally been subjected to two quite different interpretive approaches,
and each of those approaches has diverged from that generally applied
to the Necessary and Proper Clause. Intratextualism thus overstates
not only the Constitution's substantive coherence but also the uni-
formity of conventional methods of constitutional interpretation.15 4
On both normative and descriptive grounds, then, Amar's account
of constitutional meaning displays many of the features of Dworkin's
constitutional vision and shares its shortcomings. Amar is Dworkin,
albeit with a textualist and originalist emphasis that Dworkin lacks. 155
The resemblance, moreover, goes beyond the theory of constitutional
meaning. Intratextualism, like Dworkin's work, also contains an im-
plicit account of constitutional judicial review and of the judges' inter-
pretive capacities. Amar, like Dworkin, makes wildly optimistic as-
151 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518-28 (1996) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (no historical references by Justice Thomas); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 5o5 U.S. 377, 377-96
(1992) (no historical references in the majority opinion by Justice Scalia). Of course we do not
deny that the Justices sometimes explicitly debate the appropriate interpretive methodology.
Compare, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. o10, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion)
(advocating a narrow approach to tradition for purposes of substantive due process), with id. at
137-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing for a broader interpretive methodology).
152 See Young, supra note 29, at 689 n.351 (suggesting that Tribe and Dorf's critique of sub-
stantive "hyper-integration" applies "equally well to the idea that all constitutional provisions call
for the same interpretive approach, despite differences in language, history, and development').
153 Amar does not specifically discuss the Establishment Clause, but his argument regarding
the textual similarity of the First Amendment's opening language and the Necessary and Proper
Clause, see Amar, intratextualism, supra note i, at 751-52, would apply equally to each of the
First Amendment's clauses. Hence, Amar would have to say that the Establishment Clause
would not bar any action respecting religion that would be within Congress's enumerated powers.
Given the broad construction of the taxing power dating back to Alexander Hamilton, see United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (936), that interpretation would permit the very levy for the sup-
port of an established church that sparked Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance and the Vir-
ginia Bill on Religious Liberty. But see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. i, 14-18 (1947)
(stating that the Establishment Clause was designed to prohibit precisely such an undertaking).
154 Laurence Tribe has demonstrated that another canon of construction - expressio unius est
exclusio alterius - should sensibly apply to some parts of the Constitution but not to others. See
Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously, supra note 33, at 1242-43.
ss In fairness to each scholar, we should note two important differences. Dworkin, unlike
Amar, has an explicit account of constitutional obligation: the idea of "law as integrity." See
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 72, at 225. And Amar, unlike Dworkin, does not urge
judges to make overtly moral judgments. See Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity, supra
note 34, at 1262.
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sumptions about those capacities. We take up this topic in the next
Part.
III. JUDGING WITH HERBERT: INTRATEXTUALISM AND
SECOND-BEST CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Amar recommends intratextualism as a useful interpretive tool, one
suited not only to the classroom or to academic research but also to
judges deciding constitutional cases. Yet Amar pays no attention at all
to the institutional capacities of the judges who would be charged with
practicing intratextualism. That is no small lacuna in the argument.
Interpreters cannot choose among possible interpretive rules solely on
the basis of some first-best theory of constitutional meaning. Rather,
interpretive doctrine must combine a theory of constitutional obliga-
tion with an assessment of the capacities and competence of the inter-
preters who will apply the doctrine.
15 6
Judges are officials in a public bureaucracy that labors under sys-
temic constraints of time, information, and expertise. They are, conse-
quently, less like Hercules than like another character in Dworkin's
story: Herbert, the less brilliant, less resourceful, less patient judge
who serves in Hard Cases as a foil for Hercules."' No doubt because
he shares many of the same constraints as real judges, Herbert has
never formulated a top-down theory of the Constitution. And Herbert,
unlike Hercules, makes mistakes. The constraints under which judges
like Herbert act predictably cause them to err, and particular interpre-
tive tools may cause them to err in predictable directions. Interpretive
doctrine, moreover, must consider not only error but also the costs of
decision to the judiciary and litigants. In short, any recommendation
about interpretive doctrine must take into account the possibility that
judges may do better, in light of the relevant theory of constitutional
obligation, by applying a second-best ' "5 interpretive doctrine that
minimizes the risks and gravity of error and inefficiency. Viewed in
this light, intratextualism may be a poor choice for Herbert even on
Amar's premises about constitutional meaning; it is not at all clear
156 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535,
537 (1999) ('Determining which constitutional theory would best promote [widely shared] goals
requires a partly instrumental calculation, including an assessment of who our judges and Justices
are likely to be.").
1S7 See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 2, at 1103-09.
158 The second-best was originally a technical idea in economics. See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin
Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. EcoN. STUD. II, 11-13 (x956). The idea
is used here in the looser but now-standard sense of any account that assumes imperfect informa-
tion, competence, or honesty on the part of relevant agents. See Bruce Talbot Coram, Second
Best Theories and the Implications for Institutional Design, in THE THEORY OF
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 90, 90-92 (Robert E. Goodin ed., 1996).
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that intratextualism is a better interpretive strategy for limitedly com-
petent judges than the alternatives.
This Part will illustrate the gaps in Amar's argument by examining
the alternative approach of clause-bound interpretation. Clause-bound
interpretation encompasses any approach that resolves constitutional
cases by reference to the local text, history, or precedent of particular
constitutional provisions, rather than to the collateral sources Amar
examines. For present purposes the intramural differences among
clause-bound textualism, clause-bound originalism, and clause-bound
versions of common law constitutionalism are less important than the
differences between this family of approaches, on one hand, and
Amar's approach, on the other hand. 15 9 Our aim is neither to cham-
pion clause-bound interpretation nor to prove that it always outper-
forms intratextualism. But Amar cannot advocate intratextualism
without making a comparative assessment of judicial performance un-
der alternative approaches, and without considering the possibility
that some alternative, like clause-bound interpretation, may be justi-
fied as a second-best interpretive doctrine. Because Amar has not ad-
dressed these questions, the intratextualism proposal is radically in-
complete. 160
159 Two qualifiers are important here. First, as previously discussed, Amar's strong intratextu-
alism includes clause-bound interpretation as an essential component. The strong intratextualist
must form an understanding of one clause in order to compare it to another. So Amar's approach
introduces sources and arguments in addition to the sources and arguments used by clause-bound
interpreters. See supra p. 739. Second, clause-bound interpreters often use a weak form of in-
tratextualism to confirm arguments based on other sources, or simply as a tiebreaker. See Amar,
Intratextualism, supra note i, at 802-o6 (discussing Justice Scalia's use of weak intratextualism in
his dissent in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 715-23 (1988)); supra p. 734 (discussing the wide
acceptance of weak intratextualism). In this Part, we follow Amar by drawing an artificially
sharp contrast between clause-bound interpretation and strong intratextualism, in order to high-
light the marginal effects of intratextualism. The stronger the form of intratextualism, the
stronger the effects, so the costs that flow from those effects provide a more serious objection to
Amar's strong version of intratextualism than to any less ambitious version. See supra pp. 735-36
(discussing the linear character of arguments for and against intratextualism).
160 Although this section focuses on the institutional capacities of interpreters, Amar's implicit
assumption that constitutional amendments should be read to cohere with all other parts of the
document raises parallel concerns about the institutional capacities of the framers and ratifiers of
constitutional amendments. See infra p. 761 (describing Amar's implicitly Herculean picture of
constitutional amenders). If Hercules himself is unavailable to formulate amendments, we might
begin to worry about a theory of amendment that magnifies the ripple effects of constitutional
change in this way. In an intratextualist world, it would be difficult for drafters and ratifiers to
anticipate exactly how much of the Constitution they were amending; a virtuoso like Amar, after
all, may frequently dazzle us with his ability to draw unexpected parallels between seemingly un-
related constitutional provisions. Anyone partial to incremental change over more radical alter-
natives may balk at a theory of constitutional change that tends to magnify, rather than limit, the
impact of amendments.
Amar's theory of amendment may, of course, have advantages that overwhelm these cau-
tions. For present purposes, we simply note that Intratextualism's implicit theory of amendment
is unexplored and undefended. Amar's fascinating work on constitutional amendment has fo-
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A. Interpretive Romanticism and Judicial Competence
Amar is an unabashed romantic of constitutional interpretation.
The panorama of constitutional history implicit in his work glows with
the colors of interpretive heroism. "Think of the genius of John Mar-
shall in McCulloch when interpreting the genius of the Founder's Con-
stitution,"'161 Amar tells us. For Amar, Marshall is a sort of historical
counterpart to Dworkin's Hercules: 162 a jurist of unsurpassed learning
and wisdom, capable of "elegant" constitutional arguments that inte-
grate a "rich[] mixture" of sources into a "masterpiece.' 63
It is not that Amar thinks that all judges are intratextualist heroes,
or even that all judges are competent interpreters. Romantics rarely
think that; if they did, there would be no dull background to throw the
foreground hero into relief. Justice Douglas's opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut,164 generalizing a right to privacy from the penumbras
and emanations of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, moves "all
too quickly" and therefore misreads particular provisions such as the
Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause. 6 Justice Blackmun's
opinion in Roe v. Wade' 66 engages in "classically intratextualist exege-
SiS 1 67 to show that a fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but Blackmun's intratextualist technique is
"wooden" and "less compelling" than Marshall's use of intratextualism
in McCulloch. 168
No matter. Dworkin advised Herbert simply to try harder to be
like Hercules. 169 So, too, with Amar: his view seems to be that these
examples of incompetent intratextualism reveal nothing interesting or
cused on the method of amendment, rather than the consequences of an amendment for the rest
of the text. See, e.g., Amar, Popular Sovereignty, supra note 82, at 89-1 x5.
161 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 794.
162 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 72, at 239. For a critique that highlights
Dworkin's disregard for the institutional roles and limited capacities of the judges, see Michael W.
McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's
"Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1289-93 (1997); and Cass R.
Sunstein, From Theory to Practice, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 389, 395-404 (x997).
163 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 750.
164 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
165 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 797 & n.196.
166 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
167 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 774.
168 Id. at 775.
169 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 72, at 264-6;5; Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of
Fidelity, supra note 34, at 1249-50 (asserting that ordinary "[llawyers and judges" - not simply
Hercules - "must try to construct a coherent, principled, and persuasive interpretation of the text
of particular clauses, the structure of the Constitution as a whole, and our history under the Con-
stitution - an interpretation that both unifies these distinct sources, so far as this is possible, and
directs future adjudication"); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND
POLITICAL CONFLICT 50 (1996) (noting that Dworkin expects ordinary judging to be less com-
prehensive than that which Hercules could undertake, but to have the same basic character).
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troubling about intratextualism itself. They show only that it should
be done well. "All legitimate constitutional techniques can be used
well or used poorly," and intratextualism "works best when it coheres
with other types of constitutional argument and is part of a larger con-
stitutional vision." 70 The test of intratextualism's worth, for Amar, is
simply "whether it in fact ever works: does [intratextualism] in real
and hard cases ever help us to reach satisfying and sound legal re-
suits?"171
But that standard is far too lenient. It is unsurprising and uncon-
troversial that intratextualism "used well" contributes to a sound legal
result in at least some cases. Probably every interpretive tool that has
ever appeared in a judicial opinion does that. Yet Amar's criterion
says almost nothing about the critical question: whether, under Amar's
own first-best criteria, intratextualism will outperform its competitors
(such as clause-bound interpretation) when applied over the aggregate
of both hard and easy cases by the judges, the Herberts of the world,
who will actually employ it.
If every judge possessed full information about all textualist and
originalist sources and all precedents, if all judges could reason as in-
geniously as Amar, if no judges ever made mistakes, and if constitu-
tional litigation were costless, then the first-best and second-best crite-
ria would converge. But in our world fewer judges are like Hercules
or Marshall than like Herbert: constitutional litigation is costly, judges
often possess incomplete information about the content of constitu-
tional (particularly originalist) sources, and they must assess the infor-
mation they do possess with limited time and expertise. It is by no
means clear that in such a world judges should attempt to use the
same interpretive techniques and sources that they would use in a
first-best world. In practice, Amarian intratextualism would promote
not "symmetry and harmony" 72 but rather damaging incoherence, in-
fidelity to the original understanding, and instability. Conversely, sec-
ond-best judges would do better, even on Amar's criteria, by applying
second-best interpretive techniques such as clause-bound interpreta-
tion.
A difficulty for the institutional analysis is that Amar's theory of
constitutional obligation, and his criteria for determining error, remain
somewhat obscure. Although he frequently emphasizes his commit-
ment to textualism,173 Amar is continually at pains to situate the text
in its historical context. Much of his work thus has a distinctly origi-
170 Amar, fntratextualism, supra note i, at 775-76.
171 Id. at 8ox.
172 Id. at 799.
173 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Textualism and the Bill of Rights, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1143, 1143 (1998) (characterizing his recent book as a "textual analysis of the Bill of Rights").
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nalist cast.174 At other times, however, he proves willing to consider
an eclectic range of sources, including precedent and political theory.'
It is clear, at least, that Amar is not a nihilist; he believes that constitu-
tional questions have right answers. Whatever theory of obligation
supplies those answers, the critical question that Amar overlooks is a
comparative question of doctrinal choice: will real judges do better, in
light of that theory, under a regime of intratextualism or under a re-
gime of clause-bound interpretation?
The following sections sketch the case against using a strong form
of intratextualism in a second-best world. Section B examines the
comparative error costs of intratextualism, Section C examines deci-
sion costs, and Section D examines the dominant place of clause-bound
interpretation in the practice of constitutional interpretation.
B. Error Costs
Intratextualism does not ignore relevant "local" or "clause-bound"
evidence concerning the meaning of the constitutional provision at is-
sue in a given case (text A).176 Rather, it supplements that evidence
through a series of steps. First, the intratextualist identifies another
text (text B) for purposes of intratextualist comparison. Second, the
meaning of text B must be independently identified on the basis of its
own local evidence, using some interpretive theory (originalism, for ex-
ample) to arrive at a clause-bound interpretation of B. The intratex-
tualist thus typically consults the local text, history, and precedent
relevant to text B. Third, the meaning of text B is then employed to
inform the interpretation of the disputed text A.
Although this method raises the risks of error regardless of the in-
terpretive theory employed for clause B, we will first provide a con-
crete illustration by stipulating that originadism is the underlying in-
terpretive theory and thus supplies the criteria by which error is to be
judged. We will then examine two sources of error that arise from in-
tratextualism on any theory of constitutional obligation - namely, the
extreme manipulability of intratextualism, and also its potentially di-
sastrous proclivity for extending coherent and holistic error across the
whole Constitution.
z. Originalism and Error. - From an originalist standpoint, in-
tratextualism might well prove less attractive than clause-bound inter-
pretation. Amar seems to assume that the added material judges will
consult under strong intratextualism will often provide significant in-
174 See supra pp. 744-45 and note 82.
175 See, e.g., Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 81,5 (democratic theory); id. at 822-23
(precedent).
176 See supra p. 738 and note 48.
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cremental evidence of the original understanding. But parallel consti-
tutional provisions will often provide little evidence of the original un-
derstanding of the provisions most immediately at issue, and intratex-
tualism may provoke erroneous determinations of the original
understanding in some cases.
Once judges have assimilated the textual and originalist material
provided by clause-bound interpretation, the marginal utility of origi-
nalist evidence will diminish sharply as judges move to other provi-
sions and their histories. The clause-bound sources will usually pro-
vide the best, if not the only, evidence of the original understanding of
the clause at issue, because those sources have what Dworkin refers to
as "local priority."'1 77 If, to use one of Amar's examples, litigants claim
that the core meaning of Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
protects political rather than commercial speech, then the best evi-
dence of the original understanding will be found in the usual clause-
bound sources bearing on free speech. Turning for guidance to the
Speech or Debate Clause of Article I, as Amar would, 178 is likely to
provide only indirect illumination. That text predated the First
Amendment, was enacted separately, and addressed different prob-
lems.
Another reason for the diminishing utility of collateral evidence in-
volves the timing of constitutional enactments. The best cases for
Amar are those in which all of the relevant provisions were enacted at
the same time, as part of the same package. In those circumstances,
originalists might look to parallel provisions and their history to shed
light on the original understanding, just as intentionalists in statutory
interpretation often look to other parts of the statute to discern legisla-
tive intent. But many of Amar's most critical examples are not that
sort at all. Rather, the relevant constitutional provisions in those ex-
amples were enacted by different lawmakers at different times - in
some cases years apart, in some cases centuries apart - making the
Constitution look less like a single statute enacted at one time and
more like the Statutes at Large, a cumulative record of enactments
over time.1 79 Thus, Amar's analysis of the right to vote on juries de-
177 DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 72, at 250-5I.
178 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 814-17.
179 Amar is thus mistaken to analogize intratextualism to the practice of reading one statutory
section in light of other sections of the same enactment. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S.
223, 233-34 (1993) ("Just as a single word cannot be read in isolation, nor can a single provision of
a statute .... 'A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remain-
der of the statutory scheme' . .. ." (quoting United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (x988))). The correct analogy is to the practice of reading a statu-
tory provision in light of separately enacted statutes found elsewhere in the code. See, e.g., West
Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991) ("Where a statutory term presented to us
for the first time is ambiguous, we construe it to contain that permissible meaning which fits most
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scribes the Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 187o, as relevant evidence
about the meaning of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, ratified in
1971;180 and his analysis of Boiling v. Sharpe suggests that the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, from
i868, illuminate the meaning of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, enacted in 1791. '8'
As previously discussed, this temporal layering of the Constitution
creates a first-best problem for Amar (maybe "the Constitution" as a
document has no original meaning; only particular parts of it do),
18 2
but it also creates a second-best problem. When the parallel provi-
sions featured by intratextualist analysis are found in parts of the
document enacted at different times, the originalist evidentiary value
of the comparison drops off sharply. In a case like Boiling, in which
the legal claim arises under the first-enacted provision (the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause), Amar seems to think that the
framers of the second-enacted provision (the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause) may have reflected upon the meaning of
Fifth Amendment Due Process in a helpful way, and included the
Equal Protection Clause as a "clarifying gloss" that should be read
back into the earlier provision. 183  Yet there is little reason to think
that the Fourteenth Amendment's framers and ratifiers had any spe-
cial insight into the Fifth Amendment's original meaning. It is an em-
pirical question whether the framers of later provisions are skilled in-
terpreters of the original meaning of earlier provisions, and Amar has
not addressed that empirical question. The beliefs of the Fourteenth
Amendment's framers and ratifiers are authoritative background for
the Fourteenth Amendment (on an originalist methodology), but Amar
has given us no reason to think that their beliefs should be given any
special weight when interpreting earlier provisions.
84
logically and comfortably into the body of both previously and subsequently enacted law."). But
there are so many differences between statutes and the Constitution, between the institutions that
enact them and the conditions under which they are interpreted, that it is doubtful whether any of
these analogies are helpful. Amar acknowledges this doubt. See Amar, Intratextualism, supra
note i, at 8oi n.2o4 ("Some of the arguments I have offered ... may not readily transfer to the
realm of statutory interpretation."); see also SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra
note 113, at 37-41 (1997) (discussing differences between constitutional and statutory interpreta-
tion).
180 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 789.
181 See id. at 766-73.
182 See supra pp. 749-50.
183 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 772.
184 Amar might avoid this objection by arguing that, on his theory of constitutional amend-
ment, the Fourteenth Amendment would be presumed to have altered aUl the Constitution, so that
the only opinions that matter anymore, even regarding provisions that pre-date the amendment,
are those of the amendment's own framers. See supra p. 743. But this approach has the obvious
cost of unsettling the established approach to cases arising under the original Constitution; those
cases debate the meaning of the original Constitution itself, rather than the meaning of its
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Moreover, Amar's methodology extends equally to cases in which
the disputed provision was enacted later than the parallel provision, so
that the framers of the parallel provision cannot have known about the
later, disputed provision (as where Amar uses the Fifteenth Amend-
ment to interpret the Twenty-Sixth).185 True, the framers of the later-
enacted provision might have deliberately shaped their enactment to
parallel (or contrast with) the earlier provision, but that information
would be captured by a clause-bound interpretation of the later provi-
sion. Why an originalist would possibly give any independent weight
to the text and original understanding of an earlier-enacted provision,
as evidence of the original meaning of a later-enacted provision, passes
all understanding; but Amar's methodology seems to demand exactly
that. All these arguments suggest that the incremental evidence sup-
plied by intratextualism may be much less than Amar supposes.
An equally serious problem for Amar is that judges of limited in-
terpretive competence will err more frequently when relying upon in-
tratextualism to find original meaning than they err when relying upon
clause-bound interpretation. The whole bite of Amar's methodology is
that intratextualist sources must sometimes trump the (clause-bound)
textual, historical, and decisional materials relevant to the provision
most immediately at issue.186 Intratextualism will increase accuracy in
the determination of original meaning only when (I) judges err in
reading the clause-bound text, originalist materials, and precedent di-
rectly relevant to the disputed provision (text A); (2) they choose the
right second provision (text B) for intratextual comparison;18 7 (3)
judges correctly determine the meaning of text B based on collateral
sources; and (4) they then draw the correct inferences from text B for
purposes of construing text A. 18 8 Each of the last three steps intro-
amendments. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 5o5 U.S. 577 (1992) (debating the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause without reference to the Fourteenth Amendment).
185 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 789.
186 See supra p. 735.
187 This choice will not always be obvious. For instance, if Justice Marshall had chosen to in-
form his construction of "necessary" in McCulloch by looking to Article I, Section 7 (requiring
presentment to the president of every order, etc., "to Which the Concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives shall be necessary"), he might have concluded that "necessary" meant
"essential" or "indispensable." Instead, however, he looked to "needful" in Article IV, Section 2,
and reached a quite different conclusion. See McCulloch v. Maryland, i7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
48, 422 (18x6). So picking the right cross-reference matters a great deal. Amar never tells us
which provisions are to count as candidates for intratextualist consideration. Must the provisions
have at least one common word? Or perhaps one common word that is sufficiently important,
like "speech"? Maybe the interpreter must consider every provision in the Constitution (and their
histories) and then decide which are sufficiently relevant to have weight in the intratextualist cal-
culus. (This is what Hercules would do. See supra note 53.) That procedure would, of course,
heighten concerns about the decision costs of intratextualism. See ittfra pp. 772-73.
188 It is important to realize that much room for error remains at this fourth step. After all,
Amar concludes that, given identical terminology in text A and text B, the right answer is some-
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duces the potential for error. Hence, intratextualism will reduce deci-
sional accuracy when judges correctly read the relevant clause-bound
materials yet are driven away from that correct meaning by either (i)
choosing the wrong text B for comparison; (:2) incorrectly determining
the meaning of text B; or (3) drawing the wrong inference in relating
text B back to text A. Amar gives us no reason to think that the first,
accuracy-enhancing combination of circumstances will occur more fre-
quently than the second, error-provoking combination.
Note that this set of difficulties arises irrespective of whether origi-
nalism or some other approach provides the criteria for defining inter-
pretive error. Clause-bound interpretation requires judges to construe
one text correctly in any given case. Intratextualism always triples the
potential for error by requiring judges to select the proper second text,
construe it correctly, and draw the right inferences concerning its rela-
tion to the first text. This increased potential for error exists whether
the meaning of each provision involved is derived from originalist his-
tory, judicial precedents, political theory, or any other source.
2. Manipulability. - If intratextualism provides little guidance for
the judge who is simply seeking the right answer, it also proves wholly
ineffective in constraining the judge who has a more definite idea of
where he wishes to go. The manipulability of Amar's method is the
most striking feature of Intratextualism. The method can reach the
following pairs of results:
a Boling v. Sharpel89 correctly read the words "due process of
law" in the Fifth Amendment to have the same meaning as "due pro-
cess of law and equal protection of the laws" in the Fourteenth
Amendment.190 But McCulloch v. Maryland 91 correctly read the
word "necessary" in the Necessary and Proper Clause differently than
the words "absolutely necessary" in the Imposts Clause.192
* Martin v. Hunter's Lessee193 correctly read the Vesting Clause of
Article III as mandatory because the same language ("shall be vested'),
when used in the Vesting Clauses of Articles I and II, is "manifestly
mandatory."1 94 But Christopher Columbus Langdell incorrectly read
the phrase "throughout the United States" in Article I to have the same
times that their meanings should be the same, and sometimes that their meanings should be dif-
ferent. See infra pp. 767-69.
189 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
190 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 772-73.
191 17 U.S. ( Wheat.) 316 (x8ig).
192 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 756-57. Amar notes this discrepancy. His an-
swer is that, in the former case, the "[equal protection] clause is best read as declaratory, glossing
earlier words and making explicit what those words only implied." Id. at 773. This argument
reiterates Amar's view of Boiling but says nothing at all to justify the discrepancy.
193 14 U.S. (i Wheat.) 304 (x8x6).
194 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 760.
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meaning as the phrase "throughout the United States" in Article II -
a blunder because "the precise hue of [the phrase] will sensibly vary
depending on the surrounding legal context."1 95
That is to say, the intratextualist may read different phrases differ-
ently (McCulloch), different phrases similarly (Bolling), similar phrases
similarly (Martin), and similar phrases differently (as Langdell should
have). Amar notices this, and falls back upon the claim that "similar-
ity of context" or "contextual difference" will help the interpreter de-
cide what to do.196 On this modest construal, "[i]ntratextualism de-
mands only that in thinking about the one clause, we should think
about the other as well and justify differential treatment if upon reflec-
tion such treatment makes sense (as it sometimes will).' 97 But this re-
sponse retreats toward a particularly pallid and uncontroversial form
of weak intratextualism, and thus threatens to give away the game. If
the "sense" supplied by local context always dominates any inferences
that might be drawn from collateral texts and their histories, then in-
tratextualism has little bite. If, on the other hand, intratextualism
sometimes dominates local context, then the plasticity of intratextual-
ism becomes a concern that cannot be minimized.
To be sure, no interpretive approach is perfectly constraining, and
constraining power must be assessed comparatively. But unless
clause-bound interpretation never constrains, it cannot fare worse than
intratextualism fares in the examples above; and if clause-bound inter-
pretation never constrains, then intratextualism cannot either, for the
intratextualist judge may use all of the sources and arguments avail-
able to the clause-bound interpreter, and the sources added by in-
tratextualism hardly narrow the field of possible interpretations. That
intratextualism is designed to supplement, not replace, other theories
of interpretation magnifies the indeterminacy of Amar's overall ap-
proach. Just as legislative history, in Justice Scalia's view, has "aug-
mented" the manipulability of other techniques of statutory construc-
tion, 98 so too the addition of another layer of complexity to
constitutional interpretation is likely to magnify the problem of ma-
nipulability. 199 Amar's examples suggest that intratextualism simply
gives the clever interpreter another set of tools to play with in reaching
the desired result.
195 Id. at 785.
196 Id. at 8oi n.203.
197 Id. at 817.
198 See SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 1 13, at 36.
199 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42
DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (1992) ("Ironically, rules and institutions that are designed to reduce the law's in-
determinacy may actually increase it, due to the cumulative effect of their density, technicality,
and differentiation. Indeterminacy then, may be a consequence, as well as a defining feature, of
complexity.").
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In principle, it is possible that any interpretive method expanding
the amount of relevant information might narrow the range of possible
meanings generated by clause-bound interpretation, thus generating
greater constraint than clause-bound interpretation could provide. It
is an empirical question whether, in the total set of cases, such in-
stances will outnumber cases in which intratextualism loosens con-
straint by contradicting the meaning suggested by clause-bound
sources. 200 But for intratextualism to increase constraint, all the pos-
sible intratextual references (or at least the overwhelming majority of
them) would have to point toward the same meaning for text A. Any
other set of circumstances would expand the interpreter's options by
providing a choice of analogies. Our claim is that, judging by Amar's
own examples, the most likely answer to the empirical question is that
intratextualism produces more ambiguities than it resolves, and thus
loosens judicial constraints. At the very least, Amar has failed to pres-
ent the sort of counter-examples that might rebut this intuition.
3. Coherence and Error - Many interpretive accounts attempt to
secure coherent, holistic readings of the Constitution. Dworkin's idea
of "law as integrity,"201 Richard Fallon's "constructivist coherence,
20 2
and John Hart Ely's "representation reinforcement"20 3 all share this
aspiration to some degree. Intratextualism shows obvious affinities to
these theories: Amar prefers broadly based, holistic readings of the
Constitution to narrow, clause-bound ones, albeit with a textualist spin
not prominently featured in other holistic approaches.
Yet not just any coherent reading will do. Amar wants judges to
arrive at the coherent reading that is also correct on other grounds,
principally textualist and originalist ones. That combination of views
is internally consistent given Amar's deep, usually unexpressed as-
sumptions about the Constitution. "We the People" are supposed to
have enacted a text that reflects a deeply theorized and integrated ac-
count of government and its relations with the citizenry.2°4 A search
for broadly coherent "patterns and implicit principles" 20 5 of constitu-
tional meaning is simply the form of interpretation most appropriate to
200 Cf Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 35 1, 368-70 (1994) (noting that legislative history sometimes broadens the field of argument
by impeaching clear statutory text, and sometimes narrows the field of argument by resolving tex-
tual ambiguity).
201 DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 72, at 225-75.
202 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,
IOO HARV. L. REV. x18g, 1192-94 (1987).
203 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 77-86. (ig8o).
204 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside
Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 457 (1994) ("Concretely, the U.S. Constitution is a far more
majoritarian and populist document than we have generally thought...
205 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 796.
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the fundamental coherence of the framers' and ratifiers' understand-
ings.
Under less optimistic assumptions, however, Amar's unique blend
of textualism, originalism, and coherence comes apart. Even setting
aside the first-best question whether the original meaning of the Con-
stitution does indeed reflect deep structural coherence,2 06 Amar's the-
ory raises two serious problems from a second-best perspective.
First, the totalizing character of intratextualism removes all con-
straint on implausible, even "cabalistic" and "mystical" 07 claims of
patterns and resonances ranging over the whole Constitution and the
whole of constitutional law. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause must be read in light of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause, which is given a clarifying gloss in the Equal Protection
Clause, which is itself declaratory of the meaning of the Citizenship
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and all of these have hidden
links to the Bill of Attainder Clause and the Titles of Nobility
Clause.20° It all fits together. There is a feverish quality to intratextu-
alist interpretation, a lack of proportion, a propensity to see "deep de-
sign ' 209 where there is only coincidence and contingency and the lo-
calized messiness of our constitutional history. It is the same quality
found, in a more exaggerated form, in the attempts to prove by close
textual analysis that Shakespeare was Francis Bacon or the Earl of
Oxford.210
The second problem is a consequence of the first. Intratextualism
can support a range of deeply coherent readings, yet some of them will
be profoundly misguided when judged by the standard criteria of (lo-
cal) text, history, and precedent. Such readings force interpreters like
Herbert to choose among the various goods of coherence, textual plau-
sibility, and fidelity to the original understanding and clause-bound
precedent. Because he is a romantic about adjudication, Amar gives
no indication about how that choice is to be made, but judges of lim-
ited interpretive competence will inevitably make decisions that force
the choice to the surface, highlighting the internal tensions in Amar's
views. An Amarian judge may be a contradiction in terms.
206 See supra pp. 749-50, 765.
207 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 799.
208 See id. at 767-73.
209 Id. at 814.
210 See, e.g., H.N. GIBSON, THE SHAKESPEARE CLAIMANTS: A CRITICAL SURVEY OF THE
FOUR PRINCIPAL THEORIES CONCERNING THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE SHAKESPEARE
PLAYS (1962) (discussing and ultimately rejecting theories suggesting that the true author of the
Shakespeare plays was either Francis Bacon, the Earl of Oxford or Derby, or Christopher Mar-
lowe).
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Justice Douglas's opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut 21 illustrates
this dynamic. Douglas thinks that the Bill of Rights has a deep coher-
ence: it is a charter of libertarian rights that rests upon, and can be
generalized to protect, the "right of privacy."212 Amar, by contrast,
thinks that the Bill is in some deep sense a coherently majoritarian
and populist document; that its key criminal procedure provisions rest
not on a libertarian idea of privacy but on a concern for adjudicative
accuracy that serves to sort violators of the People's law from non-
violators;213 and that the Griswold opinion accordingly overstates the
role of privacy in, for example, the Fifth Amendment's Self-
Incrimination Clause. But Amar actually applauds Douglas's opinion
for its (bungled) attempt to implement intratextualist coherence. 214
That is an odd judgment. True, an intratextualist analysis of the
whole Bill of Rights done correctly (by Amar's populist lights) would
be more coherent than a clause-bound, and possibly incoherent, analy-
sis of each part of the Bill separately. But Griswold, of all cases,
should show Amar that there is another possibility: a holistic, highly
coherent, but fundamentally mistaken analysis that produces a disas-
trous misreading of the whole set of relevant provisions all at once.
An Amar with a more realistic view of judges' abilities as constitu-
tional interpreters might prefer the limited incoherence of clause-
bound interpretation to a sweeping, integrated, but erroneous univer-
sal account, so long as the clause-bound reading better satisfies Amar's
independent textualist and originalist criteria. Amar suggests, for ex-
ample, that City of Boerne's restricted reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Enforcement Clause ignores the parallel case of Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 2 15 in which the Court correctly interpreted the
Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment to authorize "broad
substantive legislation."216 Now that Boerne has been decided, how-
ever, intratextualism supports extending Boerne to the Thirteenth
Amendment just as much as it supports extending Jones to the Four-
teenth. On Amar's logic, intratextualism may simply amplify the per-
nicious effect of the blunder (if blunder it was) in Boerne.
Griswold and Boerne thus show the critical problem that judicial
error poses for Amar's blending of textualism, originalism, and coher-
ence. Intratextualism raises the stakes for constitutional interpreta-
tion: because clauses are read together, both correct readings and in-
211 381 U.S. 479 (ig65).
212 Id. at 484-86.
213 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of Constitutional Crim inal Procedure, 33 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1123, 1133-34 (1996).
214 See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note x, at 797.
21S 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
216 Amar, lntratextualism, supra note i, at 823.
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correct readings tend to snowball, sweeping up other clauses as they
proceed. On realistic assumptions about the judiciary's ability to do
textualism and originalism well, judges will frequently and predictably
be forced to choose between a strong preference for coherence and the
textualist and originalist criteria by which they evaluate coherent
readings of the Constitution. Clause-bound interpretation, by contrast,
lowers the stakes by creating barriers between clauses, thus minimiz-
ing the alarming possibility that holistic interpretation will propagate
holistic error. Clause-bound interpretation is the more risk-averse of
the two approaches, and that is probably a good idea when the risks
being run are of constitutional magnitude.
All this sketches a problem. Whether an Amarian should prefer
clause-bound interpretation depends on empirical assessments of judi-
cial competence and the risks of disastrously coherent error. It will not
do, though, to insist upon the first-best solution - readings that are
both coherent and correct - while prescribing an interpretive tool for
second-best judges, a tool that will sometimes, as in Griswold, drive
those judges to third-best outcomes. Amar's romantic preference for
coherence in interpretation produces prescriptions that do not even en-
gage these critical issues.
C. Decision Costs
Error aside, intratextualism imposes enormous demands upon
judges, who must gather, read, and interpret the voluminous and het-
erogeneous mass of originalist materials and precedents relevant to all
the collateral provisions. Amar has read all of these materials and is
justly renowned for the breadth and depth of his historical scholarship,
but the same cannot be said for most judges. Attempts to reason like
Amar will strain their resources, especially time, and test their abilities
as historians. True, judges' limited information and expertise are ob-
jections even to clause-bound interpretation (especially to the extent it
relies on originalist materials). But the whole point of a second-best
approach is to choose the comparatively best set of interpretive rules.
Intratextualism is necessarily more demanding on these counts than
clause-bound interpretation, because the intratextualist must absorb all
of the sources that the clause-bound interpreter must absorb plus all
relevant intratextualist sources, including originalist material relevant
to parallel or contrasting provisions.
These demands make the decision costs of intratextualism extrava-
gant - far greater than those of clause-bound interpretation. If
judges were to pursue intratextualism in the time-intensive fashion
that Amar does, by reading everything before deciding anything, and if
judicial resources were relatively constant, then something would have
to give: either the time spent on other cases (including other constitu-
tional cases) must decrease or the number of cases decided must de-
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crease. Neither consequence would clearly be a price worth paying for
the increased accuracy that Amar supposes intratextualism would pro-
duce. More probably, judges purporting to apply intratextualism
would selectively read and refer to collate:ral sources, reducing the
costs of adjudication but reducing accuracy itself in the bargain.
Could a division of labor between the academy and the bench solve
the problem, with academics doing all the intratextualist work while
judges defer to their conclusions? That unlikely regime would do
nothing to reduce the total decision costs of intratextualism; it would
just shift them around, and not in very attractive ways.31 7 And law-
yers would still have to incur all the costs of research, in order either to
support or to rebut academic conclusions.
The significance of intratextualism's extravagant decision costs is
certainly contestable. Although one view holds that interpretive rules
should be chosen to minimize the sum of error costs and decision
costs,2 18 many other combinations are possible. Perhaps some minimal
threshold level of decisional accuracy should be achieved before deci-
sion costs are even considered in the choice of interpretive rules; con-
versely, perhaps any interpretive rule that produces decision costs
judged excessive relative to some threshold should be rejected, no mat-
ter how (in)accurate the alternative interpretive rules would prove.
But all of these criteria might well converge in condemning intratextu-
alism. When compared to clause-bound interpretation, intratextualism
produces accuracy benefits that are at best speculative and may well
be negative, while ringing up decision costs that are clearly higher
than its competitor. Even if decision costs play only a tiebreaking role
between interpretive rules, intratextualism fares poorly indeed.
Of course, many of the questions raised here about the evidentiary
value of intratextualist sources, and about the comparative error and
decision costs of intratextualism and clause-bound interpretation, rest
on plausible but difficult empirical claims and assessments of institu-
tional competence. The questions are hard, but also inescapable.
Whatever Amar's theory of constitutional ob]igation, his desire to rec-
ommend an interpretive tool for judicial use makes it necessary to con-
front the issue of judicial competence and to compare the judiciary's
likely performance under the alternative interpretive rules, for inter-
pretive rules are the product of both a theory of obligation and an ac-
count of institutional capacities. Amar's failure to consider these insti-
217 It is at least in tension with elementary norms of due process and nondelegation for a judge
to tell litigants, "I have no need independently to examine the interpretive sources; I have the lat-
est articles from the Yale Law Journal to tell me what the Constitution means." Cf. United States
v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F3d 935, 955-56 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the district court's referral
of a nonjury action to a special master constituted abuse of discretion).
218 See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 972-74 (1995).
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tutional issues makes intratextualism a proposal that is at best incom-
plete.
D. The Puzzling Persistence of Clause-Bound Interpretation
As we have said, Amar is not the first to argue for some form of
ambitious, holistic approach to constitutional interpretation. 219  But
judges do not, and plausibly should not, behave the way the holistic
theorists would have them behave. The courts continue, in many ar-
eas of constitutional law, to practice clause-bound interpretation, rely-
ing upon locally relevant text and originalist materials combined with
heavy doses of precedent. This practice is admittedly a tendency
rather than a universal pattern. But it is a strong tendency. We see
Establishment Clause cases, free speech cases, Fourth Amendment
cases or due process cases - not Bill of Rights cases. Cases concern-
ing the separation of powers and federalism are more frequently de-
cided in holistic terms, posing as they do questions of governmental
structure and institutional relations, yet even here the provisions most
immediately at issue display a gravitational pull. Consider INS v.
Chadha,220 which struck down the legislative veto largely through a
clause-bound reading of the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses. 221
The widespread practice of clause-bound constitutional interpreta-
tion poses both normative and descriptive problems for Amar. Nor-
matively, it supports the choice of clause-bound interpretation over in-
tratextualism because it shows that Amar is proposing a potentially
destabilizing departure from the status quo. Where judges have gen-
erated long lines of precedent under particular clauses, a shift to in-
tratextualism would require judges to discard the clause-bound prece-
dents and rethink their holdings in light of the text and precedent of
parallel provisions, imposing dramatic transition costs in return for in-
terpretive benefits that, even judged by Amar's own lights, are specu-
lative.222 When, for example, the Free Speech Clause is read in light
219 See supra pp. 739-40.
220 462 U.S. gig (1983).
221 See id. at 946.
222 See Vermeule, Interpretation, Empiricism, and the Closure Problem, supra note 81, at 7o6-
07 (discussing the role of transition costs in the choice of interpretive rules). Amar does not di-
rectly state whether, or to what extent, the results of intratextualist interpretation should override
existing precedents. He does, however, urge adoption of legal rules that would, if implemented,
require wholesale overrulings. See, e.g., Amar, Intratextuaiism, supra note x, at 817 (arguing that
"content-based discriminations are not themselves (even presumptive) violations of the freedom of
speech," and that continued adherence to the present content discrimination doctrine by judges is
"obtuse and self-dealing"). And his obvious contempt for certain decisions makes it hard to be-
lieve that he would, as a judge, adhere to them as a matter of stare decisis. See id. at 802-12 (dis-
cussing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)). Amar's examples do not solely concern the
proper decision of future cases of first impression; rather, he offers an outright critique of large
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of the Speech or Debate Clause, Amar thinks it clear that "content-
based discriminations are not themselves (even presumptive) violations
of the freedom of speech, 2 3 even where political speech is concerned.
This seems to mean that courts ought not, as they do currently and
have done for a long time, subject content-based restrictions to strict
scrutiny - in other words, that a central line of modern constitutional
precedent 224 would have to go. We are at least entitled to ask what is
being gained for the shock that such a transition would inflict.
225
The persistence of clause-bound interpretation also poses an inter-
esting descriptive puzzle for holists and coherentists of every stripe.
The puzzle is not that judges do not listen to academic complaints
about blinkered interpretation; it is hardly clear that judges listen to
academics about very much anyway. The puzzle is that the very ac-
tors whose business it is to formulate rules of constitutional interpreta-
tion have somehow overlooked the superiority of ambitious, holistic
constitutional interpretation.
One explanation for the persistence of clause-bound interpretation
would emphasize its institutional advantages to judges deciding consti-
tutional cases under conditions of limited information and expertise,
and (at the upper levels of the judiciary) sitting on multimember pan-
els riven by chronic disagreement over constitutional issues. The con-
tinued sway of interpretive regimes that appear simplistic to constitu-
tional holists is plausibly understood as a product of the courts'
awareness of the limits of their own institutional capacities, and of the
judges' desire to emphasize sources on which interpreters with differ-
ent theories of obligation can converge. Judges of differing views are
frequently able to reach consensus by agreeing on a result or a set of
low-level justifications while bracketing broader theoretical or struc-
tural differences.2 2 6 Such agreements sacrifice theoretical purity, but
make collective choice possible.
For many standard constitutional sources, clause-bound (rather
than holistic) interpretation helps to promote this sort of overlapping
consensus. For example, judges' heavy reliance on the text of specific
clauses, as opposed to the intra-text of the whole document, comports
with a wide range of constitutional first principles. Originalists might
sections of existing doctrine. Our discussion of stare decisis assumes that Amar wants intratextu-
alist outcomes to trump existing precedents.
223 Amar, Intratextualism, supra note i, at 8x7.
224 See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT :x (1998) ("The content distinction is
the modern Supreme Court's closest approach to articulating a unified First Amendment doc-
trine.").
225 The abandonment of large swaths of precedent would also increase decision costs by re-
opening settled questions. See Strauss, supra note 81, at 912 (emphasizing the avoidance of such
costs as a primary benefit of conventionalism).
226 See Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, supra note 64, at 1746-47.
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see locally relevant text as the best evidence of the original under-
standing of the question at issue and might fear that the burdens and
distractions of ambitious intratextualism will make interpretation inef-
ficient and error-prone. Nonoriginalists who favor the incremental de-
velopment of constitutional principles through common law adjudica-
tion might still respect the text of specific clauses as focal points
around which social consensus and coordination have formed. 227 The
importance of collateral textual provisions for these purposes is proba-
bly far lower than for intratextualist purposes. 228
Reliance upon clause-bound precedent also makes good sense for
interpreters with differing first principles. Common law nonorigi-
nalists will obviously give great weight to such precedent, and if they
are also Burkeans, skeptical of the rationalizing powers of any par-
ticular interpreter, they will discourage judges from attempting a
grand synthesis of precedents ranging across the whole of constitu-
tional law, preferring instead attempts to bring local coherence to par-
ticular bodies of doctrine. 229 The epistemologically humble originalist
judge might see precedent relating to the provision at hand as valuable
information about how earlier judges have understood the original
meaning of the provision. In this respect, clause-bound precedent is
more valuable than precedent concerning collateral provisions; the
judges deciding the collateral cases were not focused upon the local
question currently at hand, and their indirect reflections about it, if
any, will supply only low-value information and analysis - "dictum."
If clause-bound interpretation enables and promotes judicial
agreement, Amar's commitment to a completely theorized view of con-
stitutional coherence undermines the ability of multimember panels to
reach agreement in hard cases. Perhaps a panel of Marshalls (or Her-
culeses) would converge on a single coherent reading of the document
supported by intratextualist analysis of all collateral provisions, their
histories, and relevant precedent. But a panel of Herberts will make
mistakes and disagree about interpretive first principles. Intratextual-
ism makes it more difficult to reach agreement in that it requires
judges to agree on how constitutional provisions beyond those directly
at issue in a particular case fit together. Not only does such a re-
quirement raise the stakes of disagreement, 230 it also increases the
likelihood that judges who might have been able to agree on a low-
level approach to text A will encounter various sticking points when
the debate expands to include text B. This is, in part, why a coher-
227 See Strauss, supra note 81, at 907.
228 See supra pp. 746-47 (arguing that intratextualist reliance on collateral provisions would
muddy the clarity and accessibility that make the Constitution a democratic focal point).
229 See Young, supra note 29, at 69o-92.
230 See supra pp. 774-75.
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ence-minded judge like Hercules "could not really participate in ordi-
nary judicial deliberations.... On a multimember panel, he would
lack some of the crucial virtues ... [such as] collegiality and civility,
which incline judges toward the lowest level of abstraction necessary
to decide a case." 231 Intratextualism, like the less insistently textualist
versions of ambitious coherence theory, likewise pulls against the need
for collegiality and civility, and consequently cannot offer interpretive
prescriptions that make sense of judicial practice.
CONCLUSION
Amar's Intratextualism is an intriguing effort to push an interpre-
tive tendency or weak canon of interpretation a little farther down the
road toward becoming a full-fledged theory of interpretation. He does
not recommend going all the way, and it is possible that we have exag-
gerated his commitment to strong intratextualism in this essay. But
the weaknesses we have identified are general liabilities of the in-
tratextualist method, no matter whether it is applied in a strong or
weak version. Any recourse to intratextualism will, for example, in-
crease decision costs by multiplying the number of constitutional pro-
visions that must be interpreted. And interpreters are likely to be dis-
tracted from the constitutional context of particular provisions to the
extent they are encouraged to draw cross-provisional inferences based
on textual similarities. The only difference: between the strong and
weak versions of intratextualism is the magnitude of the resulting dis-
tortion, which will vary according to the degree to which intratextual-
ism is allowed to trump other sources of meaning. In Amar's exam-
ples, intratextualism seems to trump other sources of meaning quite
frequently, so the resulting distortion is serious.
Sometimes, particularly when used as a brainstorming device or a
weak presumption in favor of common meanings, intratextualism will
produce helpful insights. This result should not be surprising. While
Amar's conclusions are often controversial, his work always inspires
productive thought, discussion, and debate. But the allure of those in-
sights must be weighed against intratextualism's normative and de-
scriptive liabilities, as well as the practical difficulties that non-
Herculean judges will experience in following the intratextualist pre-
scription. In a world where few are brilliant, brilliant theory may be a
temptation best resisted.
231 Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Arguments, supra note 64, at 1759.
